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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes possible arbitrage opportunities in credit derivatives markets using self-
financing strategies combining Credit Default Swaps and Asset Swaps Packages. We present a 
new statistical arbitrage test based on the subsampling methodology which has lower Type I error 
than existing alternatives. Using four different databases covering the period from 2005 to 2009, 
long-run (cointegration) and statistical arbitrage analysis are performed. Before the subprime 
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19%, respectively. Arbitrage opportunities are more frequent in the case of relatively low rated 
bonds and bonds with a high coupon rate. 
 
 
Keywords: Statistical Arbitrage, Credit Derivatives, Credit Spreads, Cointegration, Subsampling. 
JEL Classification: C12, G12, G14. 
 
 
 
 
* We would like to thank Max Bruche, Álvaro Cartea, Antonio Diez de los Ríos, Abel Elizalde, Javier Gil, 
Oliver Linton, Beatriz Mariano, David Moreno, José Penalva, Joaquín Poblet, María Rodríguez, Eduardo 
Schwartz, Pedro Serrano, Javier Suárez, Antoni Vaello and seminar participants at Carlos III University, 
XVI Foro de Finanzas and XXXIII Symposium of Economic Analysis for all their comments and 
suggestions. Sergio Mayordomo and Juan Ignacio Peña acknowledge financial support from MICINN 
Grant Ref: ECO2009-12551. Juan Romo acknowledges financial support from MICINN Grant Ref: 
ECO2008-05080. Any errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
1 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Dpto. Economía de la Empresa. C/Madrid, 126. 28903 Getafe 
(Madrid). Spain. E-mail: sergio.mayordomo@uc3m.es  
2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Dpto. Economía de la Empresa. C/Madrid, 126. 28903 Getafe 
(Madrid). Spain. E-mail: ypenya@eco.uc3m.es  
3 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Dpto. Estadística. C/Madrid, 126. 28903 Getafe (Madrid). Spain.     
E-mail: juan.romo@uc3m.es 
 
This paper analyzes potential arbitrage opportunities arising from a cash-and-carry stra-
tegy where the arbitrageur trades two self-nancing portfolios based in credit derivatives.
The rst portfolio contains a long position in a Credit Default Swap (CDS) while the
second contains a long position in an Asset Swap Package (ASP) funded at Euribor. Note
that this second portfolio is equivalent to a synthetic short position in a CDS. For this
reason, there should be an equivalence relationship between the payo¤s of both portfolios,
which are given by the CDS premium and the asset swap spread, respectively. If for a given
pair of payments the equivalence does not hold, there exists an arbitrage opportunity. The
existence of arbitrage opportunities is studied from two di¤erent perspectives. The rst
perspective analyzes possible long-run (cointegration) arbitrage opportunities while the
second one tests the existence of statistical arbitrage opportunities.
The popularity of CDS and ASP has been growing in the recent years. CDS is the
most widely traded credit derivative, to the extent that the British BankersAssociation
estimates that it accounted for 33% of the market share of credit derivatives in 2006.
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the value of
CDS outstanding was $62.2 trillion at the end of 2007. After the start of the subprime
crisis, the notional amount outstanding decreased up to $38.6 trillion at the end of 2008.
ASP is a liquid instrument and it is even easier to trade an ASP than the underlying
defaultable bond alone (Schonbucher (2003)).1
The existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities is analyzed using the cointegration
test proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). Given that both credit derivatives price
credit risk, we expect them to be closely linked in the long-run. Blanco, Brennan and
Marsh (2005) analyze this equivalence relationship for CDS and bond spreads and nd
support, in general, for the parity relation as a long-run equilibrium condition. Zhu
(2006), in a similar study, nds similar results and also analyzes the determinants of the
1Mayordomo, Peña and Romo (2009) report empirical evidence suggesting that ASP spreads lead
bonds spreads in the price discovery process.
1
basis, dened as the di¤erence between the CDS and bond spreads. He nds that both
spreads respond di¤erently to credit conditions such as rating events. De Wit (2006)
analyzes the basis calculated as the di¤erence between par ASP and CDS spreads and
applies a cointegration test to show that the basis is usually stationary. In fact, ASP
spreads should be a more accurate measure of credit risk than bond spreads. This idea is
supported by De Wit (2006), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis, Kakodkar and Martin (2003)
and Mayordomo, Peña and Romo (2009) among others.
Arbitrage strategies in xed income markets such as swap spread arbitrage, yield
curve arbitrage, mortgage arbitrage, volatility arbitrage and capital structure arbitrage
are addressed in Duarte, Longsta¤ and Yu (2007). They nd that all the ve previous
strategies yield positive excess returns which are positively skewed. On the basis of these
results, they suggest that there may be more economic substance to xed income arbitrage
than simply picking up nickels in front of a steamroller. Capital structure arbitrage is
usually based on strategies trading equity instruments against CDSs. Yu (2005), Bajlum
and Larsen (2007) and Cserna and Imbierowicz (2008) nd signicant positive capital
structure arbitrage returns.
Statistical arbitrage represents a zero cost, self-nancing trading opportunity that
has positive expected cumulative trading prots with a declining time-averaged variance
and a probability of loss that converges to zero. The statistical arbitrage analysis is de-
signed to exploit persistent anomalies and was rstly introduced by Hogan, Jarrow, Teo
and Warachka (2004) (HJTW henceforth) and later improved in Jarrow, Teo, Tse and
Warachka (2007) (JTTW henceforth). They test statistical arbitrage on stock markets.
HJTW analyzes momentum and value trading strategies while JTTW extends the analy-
sis to stock liquidity and industry momentum strategies. Both studies nd that these
strategies generate statistical arbitrage opportunities even after adjusting for market fric-
tions such as transaction costs, margin requirements, liquidity bu¤ers for the marking-to-
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market of short-sales and borrowing rates, although momentum and value strategies o¤er
the most protable trading opportunities.
HJTW and JTTW tests are based on the behavior of the increment in cumulative
trading prots associated with the corresponding strategies. In both studies, innovations
are assumed to be weakly dependent and stationary. Therefore, JTTW use a stationary
bootstrap methodology to compute the test statistics empirical distribution. Stationarity
is a very convenient assumption but also a restrictive one when modeling nancial time
series. Just as it is also restrictive to treat the errors in any empirical econometric work
as homoskedastic. The rst contribution of our paper is to present a new test that
allows for nonstationarity in incremental trading prots series and also for non-normal,
autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and possibly nonstationary innovations. This new test is
based on the subsampling methodology introduced in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1995)
and (1997) and extended in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999) and (2001). This technique
is based on asymptotic inference and provides an asymptotically valid test under weak
assumptions. Extensive simulation exercises suggest that our test has lower Type I error
(false positive) than existing alternatives.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper that applies the statistical arbitrage
methodology to the credit derivatives markets. This is our second contribution.
Our third contribution relates to the appropriate way of testing for arbitrage oppor-
tunities. Usually arbitrage analysis is based on the assumption that nancial instruments
(in our case bonds and ASPs) can be shorted. Nevertheless, shorting a corporate bond or
ASP is not always a feasible option (see Schonbucher (2003) or Mengle (2007)). There-
fore, we focus our analysis to testing the cases where long positions in CDSs and ASPs
are needed. Moreover, we extend the study to test the strategies that are associated
with short-sales of bonds or ASPs. We also analyze two di¤erent periods which cover the
periods before and during the subprime crisis to take into account the e¤ects of the on-
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going nancial crisis. The results suggest that long-run arbitrage opportunities decreased
substantially during the crisis, being the same true but to a lesser extent in the case of
statistical arbitrage. This is our fourth contribution.
Using four di¤erent databases (GFI, CMA, Reuters, and J.P. Morgan) and a sample
of fty seven cases, which correspond to the same number of bonds, that spans from
November 2005 to August 2007, we nd fteen long-run arbitrage opportunities with the
cointegration test. Using the methodology of HJTW and JTTW, twenty nine statistical
arbitrage opportunities are found. The new test nds fourteen statistical arbitrage op-
portunities. Employing a sample of forty seven cases which covers the crisis period and
spans from August 2007 to June 2009, we nd four long-run arbitrage opportunities and
nine statistical arbitrage opportunities with the new test. Employing HJTW and JTTW
methodology, we nd twelve statistical arbitrage opportunities.2 Moreover, we nd that
the following factors a¤ect positively and signicantly the existence of statistical arbi-
trage opportunities: bonds with relatively low issuer rating and with a high coupon rate.
In general terms, there seems to be one salient factor that determines the existence of
statistical arbitrage: credit risk. This is our fth contribution.
The paper is divided into eight sections. Section I includes the cash-and-carry arbitrage
strategies. Section II presents the long-run arbitrage test. In Section III we address the
concept of statistical arbitrage and its application. In Section IV we introduce the new
test. Section V describes the data. Section VI presents the results for long-run arbitrage
and statistical arbitrage analyses. Section VII includes robustness tests and extensions
and Section VIII concludes the paper.
2It should emphasized that our test is only applied when there is trading activity and liquid enough
prices.
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I Cash-and-carry arbitrage strategy
A Credit Default Swaps
A CDS is a traded instrument insurance contract which provides protection against
credit risk in exchange for periodic premium payments (the CDS spread multiplied by
the notional amount) until the occurrence of a credit event3 or the maturity date of the
contract, whichever is rst. In the event of default, any accrued premium is paid, and the
protection seller makes a payment to the protection buyer for the amount of the notional
against the delivery of a reference asset, a previously agreed xed payo¤ (irrespective of
recovery), or the notional minus post-default market value of a reference asset. A single-
name credit default swap (CDS) (also known as a credit swap) is the most popular credit
derivative instrument. The British BankersAssociation estimates that it accounted for
33% of the market share of credit derivatives in 2006. According to the ISDA statistics,
the CDS market exploded over the past decade to more than $45 trillion in mid-20074
and more than $62 trillion at the end of 2007. However, the notional amount outstanding
decreased to $38.6 trillion at the end of 2008.5
Most CDSs are quoted for a benchmark time-to-maturity of ve years but since CDSs
are traded Over the Counter (OTC) any maturity is possible. The spread is quoted in
annual terms but standard premium payments are settled in quarterly terms with an
actual/360day count convention. A CDS is unfunded and so, investors do not make
an up-front payment (ignoring dealer margins and transaction costs). Thus, the traded
CDS premium or the market CDS spread is an at-market annuity premium rate
_
s such
that the market value of the CDS is zero at origination.
3The credit events, similar to other Credit Derivative Denitions, are established by the ISDA and
include: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration, repudiation/moratorium or restructuring.
4This amount is roughly twice the size of the U.S. stock market (which is valued at about $22 trillion)
and far exceeds the $7.1 trillion mortgage market and $4.4 trillion U.S. treasuries market.
5In order to provide a further perspective, the value of CDSs outstanding at the end of 2004, 2005
and 2006 was $8.42, $17.1 and $34.4 trillion, respectively.
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B Asset Swap Packages
An ASP contains a defaultable coupon bond with coupon
 
c and an interest-rate swap
(IRS) that swaps the bonds coupon into Euribor plus the asset swap spread rate sA:
The asset swaps xed leg represents the buyers periodic xed rate payments, while its
oating leg represents the sellers potential payment.6 The asset swap spread is chosen
such that the value of the whole package is the par value of the defaultable bond and for
this reason, it is also known as a par to par swap.7
The IRS included in the asset-swap package has zero cost and so the asset swaps cost
is the cost associated with the defaultable bond included in the package. Given that the
asset swap spread valuation is obtained using the bonds face value (FV ), an up-front
payment must be added to the bonds price at the investment period t to ensure that the
value of the whole package is FV .8 So, the asset swap spread is computed by setting the
present value of all cash ows equal to zero and the up-front payment represents the net
present value of the swap.
C Cash-and-carry strategy
A combined long position in a CDS (buy protection) and an ASP is hedged against
bonds default risk and should therefore trade close to the price of an equivalent default
free bond. This is the intuition behind the cash-and-carry arbitrage pricing of CDSs. From
6According to the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), oating-rate
payment intervals in a IRS need not coincide with xed-rate payment intervals, although they often
do. Thus, the ASP investors could make the xed rate payments dates to coincide with the defaultable
bonds coupon payments dates while the oating payments, Euribor plus asset swap spread, could be
made quarterly.
7The ASP spread consists of two parts:
(i) The di¤erence between the bond coupon and the par swap rate, which is known as the spread from
par swap adjustment.
(ii) The di¤erence between the bond price and its par value, which is known as the spread from notional
adjustment.
8The up-front payment is paid (received) at origination, compensating the investor for bond price
being over (under) par.
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cash-and-carry strategies, we construct two equivalent portfolios which should produce the
same payments and then analyze the existence of possible arbitrage opportunities.
Portfolio I
 Long position in a CDS with an annual premium equals to _s which is paid quarterly.
Portfolio II
 Long position in an ASP whose cost is equal to the bonds par value. The investor
pays to the counterparty the bonds coupon at the coupon dates in exchange for
receiving every quarter the 3-month Euribor rate (E3m;t) plus the asset swap spread
(sA). The quarterly payment dates coincide with the CDS premium payment dates.
 Loan (principal equals to the bonds face value) at 3-month Euribor.9 Interest
payment dates coincide with both CDS premium and asset swap oating leg payment
dates.
Portfolio II is equivalent to a synthetic short position in a CDS and so, there should be
an equivalence relationship between CDS and asset swap spreads. Otherwise, arbitrage
opportunities may appear.
As CDSs are OTC instruments, it is possible to buy a CDS contract whose maturity
coincides with the bonds maturity and whose premium payments timing is agreed by
the parties.10 Thus, we take advantage of the range of CDSs maturities to t a CDS
curve using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP) algorithm that
permits us to match asset swap and CDS maturities. This method is also used in Levin,
Perli and Zakrajek (2005).
9In order to proceed in this way, we assume that the investor can borrow money at Euribor at.
Other funding rates are analyzed later.
10As the bonds maturity date approaches, the use of CDSs with a 5 years constant maturity would
lead to an overhedging, given that the maturity dates of CDSs and asset swaps do not coincide. The
consequence is that the investor will pay a CDS spread above the one needed to be fully hedged.
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At origination the cost of both portfolios is zero, and so the net payo¤is also zero. CDS
premium is paid quarterly and the rst payment takes place a quarter after origination.
At this date and at every subsequent quarter, the investor pays the CDS premium (
_
s),
receives the oating leg payment of the ASP (E3m + sA) and pays the interest associated
with the loan (E3m). The net payment is equal to the di¤erence between ASP and
CDS spreads (sAt  
_
st) converted into quarterly terms using an actual/360 day count
convention. The previous di¤erence is known as the basis. This payment is repeated
every quarter up to maturity or default, whichever comes rst.
At the coupon payment dates, the investor receives the coupon (
_
c) from the underlying
bond and delivers it to the asset swap counterparty as the xed leg payment. Thus, net
payo¤ at the coupon payment date is zero.
At the bonds maturity, the investor receives the bonds face value plus the nal coupon
payment. The coupon is delivered to the ASP counterparty as the IRS xed leg payment
while the bonds face value is employed to refund the loans principal. Moreover, from the
IRS oating leg, the investor receives 3-month Euribor rate plus the asset swap spread.
The former is employed to pay the loans interest. Finally, the investor must pay the CDS
spread, which is the price for credit risk protection. Again, as in every quarterly payment,
the net payo¤ is equal to the basis.
In case of default, at a given date  ; the investor recovers a portion of the bond face
value R(); and through the protection bought in the CDS, the investor receives the
di¤erence between the bond face value (FV ) and the recovery rate. The loan must be
refunded and its accrued interest must also be paid. Moreover, the value of the remaining
IRS included in the asset swap, vs(); the CDS accrued premium and the cheapest-to-
deliver option, chdo();11 might also be taken into account. The payment if a credit event
11This option appears because in the event of a default, not only the underlying bond but a given
number of bonds can be delivered. These bonds may have di¤erent prices after default and it gives the
holder of a CDS a cheapest-to-deliver bond option, due to the fact that he could purchase a bond cheaper
than the underlying for delivery. We ignore the e¤ect of cheapest-to-deliver options, due to the analytical
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occurs at time (t2; t3), p(); is:
p() = R() + vst1() 
_
st1(
 t2
360
) + (FV  R())  FV   E3m;t2(
 t2
360
) + chdo() =
=  _st1(
   t2
360
)  E3m;t2(
   t2
360
) + vst1() + chdo() (1)
where vst1() represents the value after the credit event of the IRS bought at t1. Given that
IRSs included in ASPs remain alive after default, they should be serviced or unwounded
at market value.
_
st1(
 t2
360
) reects the CDS accrued premium from the last payment date
t to the credit event  : The investor must pay the loans accrued interest at 3 months
e¤ective Euribor, which are calculated from the last payment date to the credit event
date: E3m;t2(
 t2
360
).
If CDS premium and asset swap spreads are similar, the only payo¤di¤erence arises at
default. In case of no default, the payments are given by the di¤erence between the credit
spreads, sAt  
_
st; in quarterly terms. Schonbucher (2003) denes a series of assumptions
under which the asset swap spread can be considered a good indicator for a fair CDS
spread. Thus, the accuracy of this relationship depends on the degree to which the
following assumptions are fullled:
(i) The initial value of the underlying bond is at par.
(ii) Interest rate movements and defaults occur independently.
(iii) Short positions in the asset swap market are possible.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that the value of the IRS does not introduce any bias
limitations on valuing them from the CDS prices.
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in the analysis.12 In particular, from (ii), the expected market value of the IRS at default
is zero although the realized value can be di¤erent to zero.13 Assumption (iii) is necessary
to reach a two-sided bound on the CDS rate. According to Du¢ e (1999), the synthetic
CDS obtained from the use of an ASP does not exactly replicate CDS payo¤s because the
IRS involved in it remains alive after default, unless it is an extinguishable IRS which,
on the other hand, is a very illiquid instrument. However, under the assumptions (i), (ii)
and (iii) and given that we use bonds issued by investment grade rms, one should expect
them to be very close.
If sAt  
_
st > 0, then a protable arbitrage opportunity exists. The investor should take
long positions in both CDS and ASP and borrow the required quantity of money in order
to nance the investment at 3 months Euribor. If sAt  
_
st < 0; the inverse strategy will
lead to an arbitrage opportunity. Thus, assumption (iii) is needed in order to guarantee
that the equivalence relationship holds and therefore, an adequate arbitrages analysis
under the cointegration methodology is based on this assumption. Nevertheless, shorting
a corporate bond or an ASP with a required maturity, even years, is unfeasible.14 This
fact implies that deviations in the equivalence relationship might not imply arbitrage
opportunities whenever an asset swap short sale is needed. Thus, traders might not be
able to exploit price di¤erentials when the CDS premium is higher than the asset swap
12Even for bonds whose prices are close to par, one observes di¤erences between CDS premiums and
asset swap spreads. There are explanations for this: CDSs contain a cheapest-to-deliver option, the
di¢ culty of short selling a bond and the repo cost associated with it, the existence of a liquidity premia
or other ignored costs and di¤erences between asset swap and CDS valuation methods.
13Independence hypothesis has been widely used in the literature. For instance, Hull and White
(2000) and (2001) extend this hypothesis assuming that default probability, interest rates and recovery
rates are independent. High interest rates cause companies to experience nancial di¢ culties and then
the probability of default increases. The interval of time between the occurrence of high rates and the
company default could even be measured in years.
14The short sale of bonds or ASPs could be done via a repurchase agreement (repo) but as Blanco,
Brennan and Marsh (2005) explain, it is impossible to borrow a bond via a repo. The reason is that repo
market for corporate bonds is illiquid and even if it were possible to short a bond via a repo, the tenor of
the agreement would be short. Schonbucher (2003) states that this limitation could be solved by issuing
credit-linked notes linked to the corresponding bond and selling them to the investors in the asset swap
market. This alternative presents other limitations given that the issuance of credit-linked notes takes
time and implies high xed costs.
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spread and this asymmetry may a¤ect signicantly the dynamic adjustment of credit
spreads. A cointegration test as the one employed in Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005)
cannot isolate strategies where an ASP short sale is involved because it is based on both
types of deviations from the equivalence relation. However, a statistical arbitrage test
enables us to relax assumption (iii) given that it permits us to study unilaterally the
existence of statistical arbitrage whenever long positions in ASPs are needed. Hence,
we exclude from the study any strategy which is associated with short-sales of bonds or
ASPs.
Other secondary assumptions which facilitate the analysis are:
(iv) Once the credit event occurs, the termination payment is made immediately after.
(v) Tax e¤ects are ignored.
(vi) Market segmentation does not a¤ect the arbitrageur, who has no restriction on
participating in the CDSs market.
In order to detect the existence of possible persistent anomalies, the same self-nancing
strategy based on the same individual bond should be repeated across time, maintaining
all the terms and conditions. Thus, the payment on a given date is added to the cumulative
trading prots from the rst investment date to the day before, which were invested or
borrowed at the risk-free rate a day ago. We employ CDSs with a notional equal to
e500,000 and assume that the strategy stops if the total investment in a given bond
exceeds 25% of the bonds issued amount or if the total expected future losses exceed
e25,000.15 Once the strategys investments stop, future payments are fully known because
both CDS and asset swap spreads are set at the investment date and remain constant.
A statistical arbitrage opportunity implies that the amount invested in the risk-free asset
15The CDS typical notional amount is e10-20 millions for investment grade credits and e1-5 millions
for high yield credits and the standard bonds face value is e1,000. Successive repetitions of this strategy
might imply high demand of a given bond that could exceed the issued amount. For this reason, we
employ CDSs with a notional equal to e500,000. This notional is high enough to deal with xed costs
and is of adequate size to guarantee that a substantial number of investments can be made.
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becomes more important over time than the daily investments.
The cumulative trading prots obtained at every period are discounted up to the initial
date. Thus, we obtain the increment in the discounted cumulative trading prots at a
given date t; v(t); as the di¤erence between the discounted cumulative trading prots
at t and at t  1.
II Long-Run Arbitrage
The cointegration test proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) has been widely used to
study the long-term relationship among non-stationary nancial series. The most common
example where this test is used is the spot price at t and the forward (futures) contract at
time t  k, which expires at time t, see Brenner and Kroner (1995). Blanco, Brennan and
Marsh (2005), Forte and Peña (2009), Norden and Weber (2004) and Zhu (2006) analyze
and, in general, nd support for the existence of an equivalence relationship between bond
and CDS markets in the long run by means of a cointegration test.16 The cointegration
methodology is also a popular tool among practitioners such as hedge fund managers (see
Alexander, Giblin and Weddington, 2001 or Alexander and Dimitriu, 2004).
The arbitrage-based equivalence of CDSs premiums and asset swaps spreads implies
that credit risk tends to be priced equally in both credit markets in the long run. By
means of the cointegration methodology, we test if a given pair of credit spreads shares a
common stochastic trend (Stock and Watson (1988)). As the companies included in our
database are free from credit events, the payments are dened as the di¤erence between
both credit spreads. Thus, the existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities will be tested
through a cointegration analysis based on the cash-and-carry strategy payments from
16The package formed by a bond and a CDS on the bond issuer company is default free and as a
consequence it is equivalent to a default-free bond. So, the CDS spread should be equal to the spread
between the defaultable bond and the default-free bond. These papers use di¤erent bonds with di¤erent
maturities in order to construct a synthetic 5-year bond spread to be compared with the 5-year CDS
spread. This synthetic bond is not traded in nancial markets and cannot be used for arbitrage strategies.
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Portfolio I (CDS spread) and Portfolio II (ASP spread).
Firstly, we study the series stationarity applying the standard Dickey-Fuller unit root
test. Subsequently, the existence of a cointegration relationship is tested based on the
following long-run relationship:
sAt = + 
_
st (2)
Assuming that both series are integrated with order one, I(1), both markets should
price credit risk equally in the long run and so, both spreads should be cointegrated with
a cointegrating vector [1; 1; c]. According to equation (2), it means that  should be
equal to 1. Parameter  should be equal to zero in order to assure that no long-run
arbitrage exists, but as there could be transaction costs or other market frictions and
even misspecications, we do not impose this condition and  can be di¤erent from zero
and equal to a given constant c. This is equivalent to saying that the basis should be
stationary, in order to support the absence of long-run arbitrage.
III Statistical Arbitrage
A Denition
Following JTTWs denition, statistical arbitrage is a zero initial cost, self-nancing
trading strategy with a cumulative discounted trading prots v(t) such that:
(i) v(0) = 0
(ii) lim
t!1
EP [v(t)] > 0
(iii) lim
t!1
P (v(t) < 0) = 0; and
(iv) lim
t!1
V ar[v(t) j v(t) < 0] = 0
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Statistical arbitrage requires that the expected cumulative discounted prots, v(t),
are positive, the probability of loss converges to zero and the variance of the incremental
trading prots v(t) also converges to zero. The fourth condition suggests that investors
are only concerned about the variance of a potential decrease in wealth. Whenever the
incremental trading prots are non-negative, their variability is not penalized. In other
words, and as JTTW state, this condition avoids penalizing positive prots deviations
from their expected values, given that investors benet from these deviations.
Although statistical arbitrage is dened over an innite time horizon, there is a nite
timepoint t, such that the probability of a loss is arbitrarily small, P (v(t) < 0) = ".
Standard arbitrage is a special case of statistical arbitrage with a zero cost trading strategy
that o¤ers the possibility of a gain with no possibility of a loss. Hence, the probability
of a loss should be equal to zero at the timepoint t; P (v(t) < 0) = 0: Thus, statistical
arbitrage converges to standard arbitrage in the limit (as t tends to innity).
B Implementation
The methodology for analyzing the existence of a statistical arbitrage opportunity is
based on HJTW, later improved in JTTW. This methodology is based on the incremental
discounted cumulative trading protsvi measured at equidistant time points. Firstly, we
employ a process denoted as the unconstrained mean (UM) model where vi is assumed
to evolve over time as:
vi = i
 + izi (3)
for i = 1; 2; :::; n where zi are the innovations such that z0 = 0 and so, both v(t0) and
v0 are zero. Parameters  and  indicate whether the expected trading prots and the
volatility, respectively, are decreasing or increasing over time and their intensity. Under
the assumption that innovations zi are i.i.d. N(0; 1) random variables, the expectation
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and variance of the discounted incremental trading prots in equation (3) are E[vi] = i
and V ar[vi] = 2i2:
The discounted cumulative trading prots generated by a given strategy are:
v(tn) =
n

i=1
vi
d N(
n

i=1
i; 2
n

i=1
i2) (4)
while the log likelihood function for the increments in equation (3) is:
logL(; 2; ;  j v) =  1
2
n

i=1
log(2i2)  1
22
n

i=1
1
i2
(vi   i)2 (5)
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the previous log likelihood function from
a non-linear optimization method based on a Quasi-Newton-type algorithm.
The cash-and-carry strategy generates statistical arbitrage opportunities if incremental
trading prots satisfy simultaneously the following hypotheses:
H1:  > 0;
H2:  < 0 or  > 
H3:  > maxf  1
2
; 1g:
The rst hypothesis is due to the second property of statistical arbitrage which re-
quires that the expectation of the discounted cumulative trading prots is positive. The
second hypothesis is obtained from the fourth property and ensures that the variance of
the incremental trading prots, given a potential drop in them, converges to zero. The
third hypothesis involves the trend in expected prots and the trend in volatility and
its expression comes from the convergence of P (v(t) < 0) to zero. It ensures that any
potential decline in expected trading prots do not prevent convergence to arbitrage.
As in JTTW, a more restrictive version of model (3) is also employed in the analysis.
It is based on constant expected prots over time and it implies that the parameter 
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is set to zero. This model is dened as the constrained mean (CM) model. Under this
assumption, the process for the evolution of the incremental trading prots is:
vi = + i
zi (6)
And the required hypotheses to be satised for the existence of statistical arbitrage
opportunities are:
H1:  > 0;
H2:  < 0.
C Hypothesis Testing
Under the assumption that the trading prots evolve as a UM model, all the following
restrictions must be satised simultaneously to have a statistical arbitrage opportunity:
R1 :  > 0 and
R2 :  < 0 or     > 0, and
R3 :    + 12 > 0 and
R4 :  + 1 > 0:
Nevertheless, if the trading prots evolve as a CM model (6) the restrictions to be
satised simultaneously become:
R1 :  > 0 and
R2 :  < 0.
The existence of statistical arbitrage is thus based on an intersection of sub-hypothesis.
On the other hand, the absence of statistical arbitrage is based on a union of four sub-
hypotheses which are given by the complementary of the previous four hypotheses. We
set the null hypothesis as the absence of statistical arbitrage and then, the restrictions for
the UM model become:
16
Rc1 :   0 or
Rc2 :   0 and      0, or
Rc3 :    + 12  0 or
Rc4 :  + 1  0:
While for the CM model the restrictions are:
Rc1 :   0 or
Rc2 :   0.
If one of the previous restrictions is satised, we conclude that no statistical arbitrage
opportunities exist.
D Statistical Arbitrage Tests
The results obtained by HJTW could be inuenced by the limitations of the Bonferroni
approach employed in the paper. Their test presents a low statistical power to reject an
incorrect null hypothesis in every case. In fact, the statistical power decreases as the
number of restrictions increases, leading to an unacceptable level of Type II error. JTTW
overcome these limitations by introducing the Min-t test methodology17 and employing
the stationary bootstrap procedure proposed by Politis and Romano (1994), which allows
for time dependence and stationary residuals, to estimate the p-values. The assumption
that the incremental trading prots innovations are normal and uncorrelated seems very
restrictive as several studies in empirical nance such as A­ eck-Graves and McDonald
(1989) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988) reveal. For this reason, JTTW test the case where
the innovations zi follow a stationary weakly dependent process. Thus, both HJTW
18 and JTTW impose a MA(1) process for zi to test if it could improve the statistical
17As the four restrictions Ri must be simultaneously satised to reject the null hypothesis of no
statistical arbitrage, the minimum of their associated t-statistics serves as a rejection criterion. Thus,
Min-t test considers separately the t-statistics associated with the four restrictions R1; R2; R3 and R4
and nds the minimum:
18HJTW proved that the presence of an MA(1) process neither alters the conditions for statistical
arbitrage nor increases the number of sub-hypothesis.
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e¢ ciency of the remaining parameter estimates and avoid inappropriate standard errors.
Nevertheless, JTTW show that allowing for this serial correlation does not change their
conclusions signicantly.
IV A New Test of Statistical Arbitrage
This paper presents an enhancement with respect to JTTW methodology. The rea-
son is that assuming stationarity seems restrictive when modelling nancial time series.
Just as it is also restrictive to treat the errors in any empirical econometric work as
homoskedastic. We allow incremental trading prots series to be nonstationary and inno-
vations zi to be non-normal, autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and possibly nonstationary.
In this more general situation, the use of the stationary bootstrap is not advisable for
estimating the p-values for the Min-t statistics.19 Thus, we employ a new test from the
use of the subsampling method introduced in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1995) and (1997)
and extended in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999) and (2001).20 We construct an asymp-
totically valid test for UM and CM models based on test statistics which are formed from
the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimators in equation (5).21
Let (x1; :::; xn) be a sample of n observations that are distributed in a sample space
19Stationary bootstrap is generally applicable for stationary weakly dependent time series. Subsam-
pling allows for a more general structure in the innovations. Thus, in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1997), it
is shown that in the presence of heteroskedasticity in residuals, subsampling gives better results for the
right choice than moving blocks bootstrap methods. This choice is not a¤ected materially by the de-
gree of dependence in the residuals. Moreover, one should obtain better information about the sampling
distribution of the statistic using the subsampling methodology. The reason is that, while the subsample
statistics are always generated from the true model, bootstrap data come from an approximation to the
true model. Another advantage of subsampling is that it has been shown to be valid under very weak
assumptions.
20One may expect that both the increment in the discounted cumulative trading prots and the innova-
tions should be stationary. Nevertheless, our sample only spans two years and a unit root test in this case
usually has low power (Shiller and Perron (1985)). It should be noted however, that subsampling metho-
dology allows for a more general process both in prots and innovations and even for nonstationarity in
some cases.
21The use of quasi maximum likelihood estimation enables us to test the existence of potential statisti-
cal arbitrage opportunities without imposing a specic process to the residuals based on the log likelihood
function derived under normality in equation (5).
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S. The common unknown distribution generating the data is denoted by P , the null
hypothesis H0 asserts P 2 P0; and the alternative hypothesis H1 is P 2 P1, where Pj  P
for j = 0; 1; and P0 [ P1 = P: Our purpose is to create an asymptotically valid test
based on a given test statistic for the case where the null hypothesis translates into a null
hypothesis about a real-valued parameter i(P ). The test statistic is dened as:
Ti;n= nti;n(X1;:::; Xn) = n(
^
i;n(X1;:::; Xn) i;0) for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (7)
where n is a normalizing constant and, as in regular cases, we set n = n
1
2 ,
^
i;n =
^
i;n(X1;:::; Xn) is the estimator of i;n(Pi) 2 R, which is the parameter of interest, Pi
denotes the underlying probability distribution of the ith statistic and i;0 is the value
of i;n under the null hypothesis. Each of the four statistics are dened from the restric-
tions Rci in Section III.C which lead to four contrasts of hypothesis based on real-valued
parameters such that:
8><>: H0 : i(P ) 6 i;0H1 : i(P ) > i;0 for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (8)
where i;0 is equal to zero in our analysis. The test is applied to the union of restrictions
Rci and so, the non rejection of one of the four null hypotheses automatically conrms the
absence of statistical arbitrage.
The distribution of the ith statistic Ti;n under Pi can be denoted by:
Gi;n(x;Pi) = ProbPifTi;n(X1;:::; Xn)  xg (9)
where Gi;n(:;Pi) converges in distribution at least for Pi 2 Pi;0; where Pi;0 denotes the
probability distribution under H0:
Because Pi is unknown, Gi;n(:;Pi) is unknown and the sampling distribution of Ti;n is
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approximated by:
^
Gi;n;b(x) =
1
n  b+ 1
n b+1X
t=1
j f bti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn)  xg (10)
where j is an indicator function,  b = b 12 such that bn  ! 0 as n !1; n b+1 indicates
the number of subsets of (X1;:::; Xn) and ti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn) is the statistic evaluated at the
block of data (Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) which is dened as:
ti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn) =
^
i;n;b;t(Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) 
^
i;n;t (11)
where
^
i;n;b;tis the estimator of i;n(Pi) 2 R based on the subsample (Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) and
^
i;n;t is the estimator of i;n for the whole sample.
The only assumptions that will be needed to consistently estimate the cumulative
distribution function Gi;n(x; Pi) are the following:
(i) The estimator, properly normalized, has a limiting distribution.
(ii) For large n, the distribution function of the normalized estimator based on the sub-
samples will be, on average, close to the distribution function of the normalized estimator
based on the entire sample.
Using this estimated sampling distribution, we can compute the critical value for the
test at least under the null hypothesis. It is obtained as the 1   quantile of
^
Gi;n;b(x):
gi;n;b(1  ) = inffx :
^
Gi;n;b(x) > 1  g (12)
Our purpose is to test if Tn is rejected at a level of signicance  depending on whether
the statistic exceeds the exact 1   quantile of the true sampling distribution Gn(x;P );
that is gn(1   ; P ). Of course, P is unknown and so is gn(1   ; P ): However and
according to Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999), the asymptotic power of the subsampling
test against a sequence of contiguous alternatives fP ng to P with P in P0 is the same
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as the asymptotic power of this ctitious test against the same sequence of alternatives.
For this reason and given that there is no loss in e¢ ciency in terms of power, we test the
statistic Tn against the 1   quantile under P0; g(1  ; P0):
The steps in which subpsampling technique is applied in this study are as follows:
1. Once the parameters have been estimated by QML, we calculate the test statistic
for the whole sample:
Ti;n= n(
^
i;n(v1;:::;vn)  i;0) for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (13)
and the estimated residuals
^
zi :
22
^
zi =
vi   ^i
^

^
i
^

for i = 1; :::n (14)
2. We create subsamples of consecutive blocks of data with length b such that the rst
subsample of residuals is dened by (
^
z1; :::;
^
zb); and so on.
3. We generate n b+1 successive subsamples of trading prots (vi ; :::;vi+b 1) from
the corresponding residuals (
^
zi; :::;
^
zi+b) for i = 1; :::; n  b: The trading prots are
calculated with the parameters under the null hypothesis such that their values bind
the restrictions. Thus, the parameter values are (; ; ; ) = ( 10 6; ^; 1; 0:5)
for the UM model and (; ; ) = (0;
^
; 0) for the CM model:23
22We nd that the residuals follow ARMA processes and, in some cases, they even present heteroskedas-
ticity. It conrms that it is very restrictive to impose a MA(1) process for zi.
23For the UM model, ve restrictions should be simultaneously satised to prove the existence of
statistical arbitrage. However, these ve restrictions involve three parameters and not all the restrictions
are necessarily binding. As HJTW suggest, a model within the null family and on the boundary of all the
inequality restrictions is not available. We employed other values of  such as -0.0001 or -10 8 in order
to have  in the equation, but results are similar in the three cases. The values of parameters  and 
bind the third restriction and we employ them due to their good properties in JTTW. Parameter
^
 does
not appear in the restrictions and we use the value of the QML estimator for  in the whole sample.
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vi = i
 +
^
i
^
zi (15)
4. We estimate n  b+ 1 times by QML the parameters for the successive blocks and
for every block we calculate the statistic ti;n;b;t such that we have n  b+1 statistics.
5. Finally we approximate the sampling distribution of Ti;n by means of the estimated
sampling distribution bGi;n;b(x) as in equation (10) and compute the critical values
gi(1   ; P0) as in equation (12) under the null hypothesis. We reject the null
hypothesis at a degree of signicance of  if and only if Ti;n exceeds the corresponding
critical value gi(1  ; P0):
There is not a universal prescription for the choice of the optimal block size.
Moreover, Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999) show that subsampling works quite well even
with a data-driven choice of block size. Block sizes should not be too large or small but
the e¤ect of di¤erent choices of b diminishes as the sample size increases.24
In the correct range of b, the condence intervals should be stablewhen considered
as a function of the block size. For this reason, we use the method dened by Politis,
Romano and Wolf (1999) as the Minimum Volatility Method to select the optimum b :
1. Compute a subsampling quantile gn;b(1  ) for b = bsmall = n 25 to b = bbig = n 45 :
2. For each b compute a volatility index as the standard deviation of the quantiles in
a neighborhood of b, V I(gn;b k(1  ); gn;b(1  ); gn;b+k(1  )) with k = 2:
3. Pick the value b corresponding to the smallest volatility index and use gn;b(1 )
as the critical value of the test.
After estimating the optimal block size, we conrm, as expected, that there is not a
common optimum block size for every sample. In most cases, the optimum block size is
24For b too close to n all subsample statistics
^
i;n;b;t will be almost equal to
^
i;n; resulting in the
subsampling distribution being too tight and in undercoverage of subsampling condence intervals. For
b too small, the intervals can undercover or overcover depending on the state of nature.
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such that the ratio block size/sample size is between 0.2 and 0.45.25 Longer blocks are
needed to capture greater dependence in the innovations.
We now compare the new test with JTTWs looking at their Type I errors. Given
that the null hypothesis is no arbitrage opportunities it seems advisable to choose the test
with lower false positiverecord (i.e. the most conservative). The absence/existence of
statistical arbitrage is based on three hypotheses, each of them associated to di¤erent
requirements, or equivalently, on four restrictions Rci (see Subsection III.C). We study
both tests using simulations of the series of the increment in the discounted cumulative
trading prots. These prots are simulated by setting parameters ;  and  such that they
hold a given restriction Rci ; associated to the complementary of one of the three hypotheses
in Subsection III:B; and do not hold the remaining ones. The parameters employed to
simulate the prots are close to the limits of the existence/absence of statistical arbitrage
in order to discriminate between both tests in the most detailed way as possible.26 This
allows us to have a further perspective of the individual restrictions. We perform 100
di¤erent simulations with sample size of 400 observations.27 As we nd that the residuals
are neither normal nor follow a MA(1) process, which is the process imposed in JTTW
methodology, we compare both test after generating randomly the residuals according
to three di¤erent processes: i:i:d: normal residuals; the residuals follow an ARMA(1; 1)
25We require that the selected block size, b; can also be obtained from the expression b = nx with
x 2 (0:2; 0:8): It guarantees that the required assumption which states that b  ! 1 as n  ! 1 and
b
n  ! 0 as n  !1 is fullled.
26The restriction that holds is related with each of the three requirements needed for the exis-
tence/absence of statistical arbitrage. We rst compare both test using simulations where the rst
restriction, Rc1, holds and employing as parameters:  =  0:001;  = 1;  = 0:5 and  =  0:5: The
second comparison is based on the ability of the tests to detect the cases where Rc2 holds and we employ
as parameters:  = 1;  = 1;  = 0:1 and  = 0:05. Finally, we evaluate the case where both Rc3 and R
c
4
hold according to the following parameters:  = 1;  = 1;  =  1:05 and  =  0:45. Note that the last
case involves two restrictions, the reason is that both of them are associated with the requirement which
states that the probability of loss converges to zero.
27This length is close to the average number of observations or investment days in the di¤erent cases
analyzed in this paper. Moreover, as a test of convergence, we simulate a series of prots with a sample
length equal to 5,000, and nd that the estimated coe¢ cients are exactly the same to the ones employed
to do the simulation.
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process with the AR and MA coe¢ cients equal to 0.9 and 0.75, respectively; or the
residuals follow an ARMA(1; 1) process such that the coe¢ cients of the AR and MA
parts are 0.5 and 0.75, respectively.
We nd that both tests are equally e¤ective when either restriction Rc1; which states
that the expected cumulative discounted prots are negative, or restrictions Rc3 and R
c
4,
which state that the probability of loss does not converge to zero, hold. However, when
restriction Rc2; which states that the variance of the incremental trading prots does
not converge to zero, hold, we nd that our test cannot reject the absence of statistical
arbitrage at any standard condence level, while JTTW test signals the existence of
statistical arbitrage at condence levels between 1% and 5%, depending on the residuals
process, when in fact there is no arbitrage opportunity.
V Data
Our database contains daily data on Eurobonds and ASPs denominated in Euros
and issued by non-nancial companies that are collected from Reuters and on CDSs also
denominated in Euros and issued by the same non-nancial companies that are obtained
from four di¤erent databases: GFI, Reuters and Datastream and J. P. Morgan.
We employ four di¤erent CDSs databases in order to have more robust results and to
minimize the probability that measurement errors could a¤ect our results. This variety
of sources also serves as a check of the reliability of our data. The rst source we employ
is GFI which is a major inter-dealer broker (IDB) specializing in the trading of credit
derivatives.28 GFI data contain single name CDSs market prices for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
28Fulop and Lescourret (2007) describes GFI as an hybrid voice-electronic execution platforms for
CDSs where dealer may be providers or consumers of liquidity. These authors state that although IDBs
systems are not costless due to the existence of the interdealer brokers fee, they allow decreasing search
costs and make the matching process between buyers and sellers more e¢ cient. Moreover, and according
to GFI, it is the leading broker since it would represent 60% of the interdealer brokerage activity. GFI
data are available from Reuters.
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years maturities. These prices correspond to actual trades, or rm bids and o¤ers where
capital is actually committed and so, they are not consensus or indications.29 Thus, these
prices are an accurate indication of where the CDS markets traded and closed for a given
day. For some companies and for maturities of two and four years, the data availability
is scarce and in these cases, whenever there exist data on CDSs real market prices for
the maturity of 5 years, we employ mid-price quotes from a credit curve also reported
by GFI.30 GFI data have also been used by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Predescu
(2006), Saita (2006), Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007), Fulop and Lescourret (2007)
or Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2009) among others.
The second source is Reuters. Reuters takes CDS quotes each day from over 30
contributors around the world and o¤ers end of day data for single names CDSs. Before
computing a daily composite spread, it applies a rigorous screening procedure to eliminate
outliers or doubtful data. According to Longsta¤, Mithal and Neis (2005), as the data set
includes quotations from a variety of credit derivatives dealers, these quotations should
be representative of the entire credit derivatives market. Jankowitsch, Pullirsch, and Veµza
(2008), among others, employ CDSs data from Reuters.
The third source is CMA DataVision(TM) which is available from Datastream. CMA
DataVision is consensus data sourced from 30 buy-side rms, including major global
Investment Banks, Hedge Funds and Asset Managers. CMA DataVision provides full co-
29Consensus and indicative data are trusted less now that the markets are so volatile. There exist
di¤erences of up to 100% between consensus prices from leading providers compared to actual trades on
GFI systems. That is because consensus is inherently slow and the prices originate from back o¢ ce sta¤
who can be swayed by the positions they hold and they do not have a front o¢ ce view.
30The GFI FENICS R Credit curves are calculated each hour for over 1900 reference entities. The
calculation of the curves gives preference to real trades and quoted mid points where available, and in
their absence will calculate a running point level using the John Hull and Alan White methodology to
ensure a credit curve always exists for each reference entity. This curve is a good approximation for CDSs
at any maturity as several error analyses reveal. The median of the absolute di¤erence in basis points
between ve years CDS premiums as dened from credit curve and the actual quotes or transaction prices
for the period between April 2001 and May 2002, is equal to 1.16, 2.01 and 3.82 basis points for AAA/AA,
A and BBB ratings for a total of 2,659, 9,585 and 8,170 companies respectively. Moreover, market CDS
spread could be di¤erent from what we are assuming to be the true CDS spread by as much as 3.725 bps.
on average.
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verage of relevant tenors, currencies, and seniorities for single names, indices and tranches
and o¤ers quoted CDS prices (bid, ask and mid). Among the papers that employ CMA
data we mention Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam
and Mahanti (2009).31
Our fourth database, employed also in Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko and Huang (2002),
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) and Chen, Cheng and Liu (2008) among others,
contains mid-market data provided by J. P. Morgan which is one of the leading players
in the CDS market.32
Given the four di¤erent data sources on CDSs spreads, we cross-check the data using all
the sources in order to conrm the validity of any CDS price. Due to liquidity restrictions
and in order to require that investments take place whenever there is trading activity,
these investments are restricted to dates when we observe 5-year CDS actual trades or
rm bids and o¤ers where capital is actually committed according to GFI data.33 We nd
that all data sources are largely in agreement between them. Moreover, at specic dates
when the spreads diverge signicantly between several sources, the observation is deleted
from the sample. The results that we report in the paper are the ones obtained with GFI
data.34
For each bond there is information on both bid and ask prices, the swap spread, the
asset swap spread, the sector of the entity and its geographical location, the currency,
the seniority, the rating history (Fitch, S&P and Moodys ratings), the issuance date and
31Both papers employ two di¤erent data sources, GFI an CMA, to construct their database. They nd
that there exists consistency between the two sources in the periods where there is an overlap between
them. CMA DataVision data are also available via the Bloomberg data service. Among the papers that
employ Bloomberg, without detailing if the data proceed from the CMA system or not, are Cserna and
Imbierowicz (2008) and Das, Hanouna and Sarin (2009).
32According to Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko and Huang (2002), J.P. Morgan was the most active
trader in terms of CDS transactions.
33Even when CDS quotes are available at these dates from any of the sources, we do not employ them.
Thus, these dates do not indicate missing observations in a given source of data, but lack of trading
activity.
34The results using the other three databases are consistent with GFIs and are available upon request.
26
the amount issued, the coupon and coupon dates and the maturity. We use bonds whose
maturity at the investment dates is lower than ve years. Several bonds issued by the
same company may be used whenever they satisfy all the required criteria. The reason
is that although CDS spreads quotes are referred to the issuer and not to an individual
bond, asset swap spreads are quoted for individual bonds. Due to liquidity considerations,
bonds with time to maturity equal to or less than twelve months in the date corresponding
to their last observation are excluded. Moreover, our sample contains xed-rate senior
unsecured Euro denominated bonds whose issued quantity exceeds 150 millions of Euros.
Other requirements imposed on bonds to be included in the sample are: i) straight bonds
, ii) neither callable nor convertible, iii) with rating history available, iv) with constant
coupons and with a xed frequency, v) without a sinking fund, vi) without options, vii)
without an odd frequency of coupon payments, viii) no government bonds and ix) no
ination-indexed bonds. We also cross-check the data on bonds with the equivalent data
obtained from Datastream. Due to liquidity restrictions, investments are restricted to
periods where there exist 5-year CDS data on either actual trades or bids and o¤ers
where capital is committed.
The data spans from November 1st, 2005 to 29th June 2009. However, we split the
data into two subperiods to take into account the possible e¤ects of the ongoing nancial
crisis. The rst subperiod covers the period from November 1st, 2005 to August 8th, 2007
while the second one spans from August 9th, 2007 to June 29th, 2009.35 Our sample size is
comparable to others in the literature on CDS and bond spreads, both in terms of sample
size and number of companies.36 The nal sample consists of 50 non-nancial companies
35The rst subperiod does not show any episode of signicant market turbulence. This subperiod
starts after the episode of GM and Ford downgrades to junk categorywhich reduced market liquidity
and ends with the beginning of the subprime crisis which as usually is set at 9th August 2007. The
subprime crisis implies an illiquid regime for ASPs, bonds and CDSs markets.
36Longsta¤, Mithal and Neis (2005) include 68 rms from March, 2001 to October, 2002, Blanco,
Brennan and Marsh (2005) use 33 American and European companies from January 2001 to June 2002,
Zhu (2006) use 24 investment-grade companies from January 1999 to December 2002 and Forte and Peña
(2009) employ data for 20 companies from September 2001 to June 2003.
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and 66 bonds. In the rst subsample we employ 57 bonds and 45 companies while in the
second one we use 47 bonds and 37 companies.37 Table I presents information about all
issuers, asset swaps, bonds and CDSs in the two di¤erent periods under study. As shown
in Panel B1 and B2 of Table I, there is a great deal of variation in the amount issued
and, in the rst period, in the sample size. The last column shows that bonds traded, on
average, above par in the rst period and below par in the second one. Panels C1 and C2
include descriptive statistics for CDS, asset swap and bond spreads for the rst and second
subperiod, respectively. On average, the CDS spreads seems to be lower and less volatile
than the ASP spreads in both subperiods. The last column in this panel also reveals
that both CDSs and ASPs are usually highly correlated with few exceptions (Carrefour
I, Siemens, Technip and Veolia Environ in Panel C1 and Carrefour II in Panel C2). Note
that the average correlation increased substantially in the crisis period. Finally, Panels
D1 and D2 present descriptive statistics for the basis for the rst and second subperiod,
respectively. We observe in Panel D1 that the average basis is negative for 17 of the 57
issues while in Panel D2 it is negative for 20 of the 47 issues. On average, the basis is
lower and much more volatile in the second period which suggests that arbitrage strategies
become riskier during the crisis. Panels E1 and E2 report the summary statistics of the
CDS spreads for the four databases during the rst and second subperiod, respectively. We
observe that the CDS spreads average values are similar across the di¤erent databases.38
The average of the relative di¤erences between the CDS spreads of the four databases is
similar before and after the crisis.
37Our initial sample was formed by 301 corporate bond issuers. We found a total of 135 Euro de-
nominated bonds that mature before June 2012 but only 86 of them include reliable information on the
CDS spreads and the asset swap spreads. Of these, 2 bonds have been discarded because the issued
amount does not exceed 150 million Euros, another 4 bonds were discarded because they were not invest-
ment grade bonds during the whole sample period. The time to maturity was lower than twelve months
by August 2007 for 4 bonds that were discarded, another 3 bonds were discarded because their asset
swap spreads were persistently negative and, nally, 7 bonds were discarded because prices were too far
from par. Thus, although we consider all the bonds issued by non-nancial European companies to be
employed in our study, the nal number of bonds is 66 due to the imposed requirements.
38Reuters EOD (end of day) data is a relatively new source and is available since 2007.
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<Table I about here>
VI Results
A Long-Run Arbitrage Test Empirical Results
Table II shows that most spreads are I(1). Only in four cases during the rst subperiod,
Carrefour II, Casino II, Compass Group and Siemens, and in other two cases during the
crisis period, Carrefour II and Schneider, credit spreads are I(0). Table II indicates that
the long-run equivalence relationship holds and the two markets move together in the
long run in 33 of the total 53 cases in the rst period and in 38 of the total 45 cases
in the second subperiod.39 The potential long-run arbitrage opportunities could be due
to the presence of a cheapest-to-deliver option in the CDS price or the constraints in
the bondsshort-sales, among other causes. These opportunities should be exploited by
means of cash-and-carry arbitrage strategies, where either long or short positions in ASPs
are needed. Shorting asset swaps is not an easy thing and for this reason, we distinguish
between the strategies that involve shorting asset swaps and the ones that involve long
positions in asset swaps. Thus, we consider that a given strategy is based on an asset swap
short sale whenever the sum of the discounted trading prots is signicantly negative. This
occurs in Akzo Nobel I, Bouyges II, Scania, Tesco I and Vodafone in the rst subperiod
and in Enel, Energias de Portugal I and Thyssenkrupp in the second subperiod. On the
other hand, the sum of the discounted trading prots is signicantly positive for the rest of
the cases which means that there are 15 potential long-run arbitrage opportunities based
on long positions in ASPs in the rst period and 4 opportunities in the second period. The
decrease in long-run arbitrage opportunities is consistent with the increase in correlation
across nancial markets in crisis periods documented in many papers. Although Table
39Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2006) nd a long-run equivalence relationship between
CDS and bond spreads in 26 of 33 cases and in 15 of 24 cases, respectively.
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II reports the results obtained from GFI data, the same results are obtained when using
any of the other data sources. We next analyze the potential arbitrage opportunities that
could be exploited by means of long positions in both asset swaps and CDSs employing
the methodology based on the statistical arbitrage test.
<Table II about here>
B Statistical Arbitrage Test Empirical Results
The increments in the discounted cumulative trading prots v(ti) are summarized
in Table III. Panel A reports the prots obtained in the rst subperiod while Panel B
reports the prots during the crisis period. We observe that the average value is around
74 Euros in the rst subsample and 192 Euros in the second one. These prots present
a high deal of variation, 78 and 420 Euros on average in the rst and second subsample,
respectively. The coe¢ cient of variation for these prots during the crisis doubles the one
observed in the rst period. Note that the average number of days under study is higher
in the second subsample with respect to the rst one, 363 against 462 days. The vast
majority of the cases where the average basis is negative also have a negative average of
v(ti):
<Table III about here>
The Panels A and B of Table IV show the results for the analysis of statistical arbitrage
under the UM model during the rst and second subperiods, respectively. The results
obtained for the rest of data sources (Reuters, CMA and JPMorgan) are similar to the
ones reported in Table IV. The sign of parameter  for every company in Panel A is in
line with the sign of the mean incremental cumulative trading prots collected in Panel A
of Table III with few exceptions (British AM Tob. I and Enel). The unconstrained mean
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specication is not rejected in most of the cases as the t-statistic associated with the pa-
rameter  reveals. Fourteen statistical arbitrage opportunities are found at 5% condence
level during the period before the crisis. Eight of these cases also are long run arbitrage
opportunities. However, the existence of statistical arbitrage is strongly rejected for cases
such as Akzo Nobel I, Bouygues II, Scania, Stora Enso, Telefonica, Thales, Thyssen-
krupp, Tesco I and Vodafone where supposedly there are long run arbitrage opportuni-
ties. During the crisis period we nd nine statistical arbitrage opportunities and among
them, there are the four long run arbitrage opportunities based on long positions in ASPs.
As in the rst subperiod the existence of statistical arbitrage is strongly rejected for some
cases where supposedly there exist long run arbitrage opportunities which should be ex-
ploited by shorting ASPs such as Enel, Energias de Portugal I and Thyssenkrupp. The
last column in Panels A and B of Table IV show the results using JTTWs test. It nds 29
arbitrage opportunities at 5% condence level during the rst subperiod and 12 opportu-
nities more during the second one.40 As expected and given the simulations results, our
test seems to be more conservative than JTTW. The di¤erences between both tests are
due mainly to the estimators and their corresponding p-values associated with restrictions
Rc1 and R
c
2 which are dened in Section III.C.
41 The UM model usually presents smaller
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwartz Information Criteria (SC) than the CM
model, suggesting that the former is the most appropriate model. For this reason we only
40We nd that both HJTW and JTTW tests o¤er similar results.
41Our test does not reject the absence of statistical arbitrage in some cases where the mean parameter
 is not signicantly di¤erent to zero at the 5% level (France Telecom I, Kingsher, SES and Vivendi in
the rst subperiod, see Panel A of Table IV, and Casino I and Union Fenosa in the second subperiod, see
Panel B of Table IV). With respect to restriction Rc2, our test does not nd that the mean rate of growth
is signicantly higher than the variance rate of growth for Akzo Nobel II, KPN, Saint Gobain II, Saint
Gobain IV, Thyssenkrupp and Volkswagen in the period before crisis and for Volvo in the crisis period.
Indeed, in all these cases, the t-statistic associated with the di¤erence of the QML parameters    ;
which is part of the restriction Rc2 in Section III.C, is not signicantly higher than zero at a signicance
level of 5%. Restriction Rc2 ensures that the variance of the incremental trading prots, given a potential
drop in them, converges to zero. Note that it corroborates the results obtained when we compare the
Type I errors of both tests focused on restriction Rc2.
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report the results obtained for the UM model.42
Although shorting a corporate bond or ASP is not always a feasible option, we also
apply the statistical arbitrage test to the strategy based on short positions both in Portfo-
lio I and Portfolio II for the whole sample of entities. We nd three additional statistical
arbitrage opportunities during the period before crisis (Carrefour II, British AM Tob. I
and France Telecom III). The number of statistical arbitrage opportunities based on ASP
short sales increases to eight during the crisis period (Astrazeneca, BASF, Enel, France
Telecom III, Iberdrola I, PPR, Thyssenkrupp and Volkswagen).
The more noticeable di¤erence between both subperiods is the number of statistical
arbitrage opportunities found when the strategies are based on ASPs short sales. In
periods with low liquidity, ASPs short sales are less feasible that during normal regimes
of liquidity. If shorting the ASPs is not feasible, it could prevent investors to exploit
potential arbitrage opportunities and then deviations from the equivalence relationship
between ASPs and CDSs spreads could persist over time. Comparing Panels A and
B of Table III, we observe that the average of the incremental trading prots, v(t);
is noticeably higher during the subprime crisis. This could lead to the appearance of
more statistical arbitrage opportunities if that deviation between the ASPs and CDSs
spreads persists over time. However, the volatility in credit spreads has also increased
considerably during the crisis which makes that the variance of the incremental trading
prots also increases and as a consequence, it could even lead to the non-rejection of the
restriction Rc2.
<Table IV about here>
Table V shows the prots, the total investment, the returns, the probability of a loss
and a performance ratio of the arbitrage opportunities. As one of the statistical arbitrage
42Detailed results for the statistical arbitrage tests with the CM model and for the AICs and SCs
corresponding to the UM and CM models for both subperiods are available upon request.
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conditions states that investors are only concerned about the variance of a potential
decrease in wealth, we avoid penalizing positive prot deviations from their expected
values, since investors benet from these deviations. For this reason, as a performance
measure ratio we show a modied version of the symmetric downside-risk Sharpe ratio in
Ziemba (2005). This performance ratio is dened as the ratio between the total prots
and the corresponding semi-standard deviation of payments.43 Note that the number of
investment days presents a high deal of variation. In fact, we observe that in some cases
this number is even below ten. The reason is that in those cases the investment strategy
stops because the total expected future losses exceed e25,000.44 Regarding the returns
and the performance ratio obtained during the period before crisis reported in Panel A of
Table V, it should be noted that the only attractive opportunities compared to the ones
where our test nds statistical arbitrage are KPN, Saint Gobain II, Saint Gobain III, Saint
Gobain IV and Vivendi. However, KPN and Saint Gobain II do not fulll the restriction
Rc2; the probability of loss in Saint Gobain III is around 10%, while in Vivendi and Saint
Gobain IV investments take place on only 23% and 21% of the total potential trading days,
respectively, and so total prots are low. On the other hand, we nd statistical arbitrage
opportunities under both HJTW and JTTW methodologies which correspond to cases
43The semivariance of payments is calculated as:
2  =
nP
i=1
(paymenti payment)2 
n 1
where paymenti represents the payment at time i; payment
 refers to the payment in the 30th percentile
and n denes the number of observations. The summatory is applied whenever the payment is below
payment

: The ratio is dened as:
S  = Total Pr ofitsp2  :
44As the stop rule imposed to the strategy leads to a low number of investment days in some of the
cases where the existence of statistical arbitrage is rejected, we extend the analysis by excluding this
stop rule and nd similar results (see Section VII). In that case the number of investment days coincide
with the number of observations reported in the Panel B2 of Table I whenever the total investment in
a given bond does not exceed 25% of the bonds issued amount. Note also that the cases where the
investment strategy stops, due to the high expected future losses, correspond to potential statistical
arbitrage opportunities using inverse positions based on short sales of ASPs.
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with either a high probability of a loss or a poor performance or both, such as Bouygues
I, France Telecom I, Kingsher, SES, Stora Enso, Union Fenosa or Volkswagen. These are
rejected under our test. According to the returns and performance ratio corresponding
to the crisis period which are reported in Panel B, we observe that the only attractive
opportunities that our test does not detect are France Telecom II and Union Fenosa.
However, France Telecom II does not fulll the restriction Rc2 and in Union Fenosa the
mean parameter  is not signicantly higher than 0 and moreover the number of days
with losses is around 24% of the total. HJTW and JTTW tests consider as statistical
arbitrage opportunities Casino I, Union Fenosa and Volvo. However, in these cases we
observe a high probability of a loss and a poor performance compared with the statistical
arbitrage opportunities detected by our test which, on the other hand, seem to be the
most protable opportunities according to all the performance measures of Table V.
<Table V about here>
Finally, we test how asset swaps, bonds and CDSs characteristics inuence the
existence of statistical arbitrage. To achieve this, we run a Probit regression with he-
teroskedasticity robust standard errors for the total 104 cases studied in both subperiods,
using as dependent variable a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a statistical arbi-
trage opportunity and 0 otherwise. In order to control and test the e¤ect of the crisis,
we create a dummy variable equal to one if a given case corresponds to the second sub-
period. As the coe¢ cients in the Probit model are di¢ cult to interpret, we compute the
marginal e¤ects that indicate the change in the probability of statistical arbitrage for a
marginal change in the independent continuous variable or for a discrete change in the
independent dummy variable. Results are shown in Table VI. The statistical arbitrage
opportunities seem to be more frequent when the asset swaps packages contain relatively
low-rated bonds with a high-coupon rate. Moreover, apparent long-run arbitrage oppor-
tunities are related with statistical ones. Thus, a long-run arbitrage opportunity is also
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a statistical arbitrage one with a probability around 34%. Finally, the crisis dummy has
a non-signicant e¤ect on statistical arbitrage. According to these results, there is one
salient factor that determines the existence of statistical arbitrage: credit risk. Thus, the
higher the bond or issuer risk, the more frequent are the persistent deviations between
CDSs and ASPs spreads. Liquidity may be other salient factor that a¤ects statistical
arbitrage. However, as Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) state, while liquidity is easy
to dene in theoretical terms, its empirical measurement in an accurate and reliable man-
ner is quite di¢ cult, except in markets that are relatively very liquid. Credit markets are
not the most liquid ones and moreover, we nd that the potential liquidity proxies are
correlated with the issuer rating and bond coupon. We have employed several liquidity
measures in the Probit regression but they are not signicant with high p-values which
suggests a potential relation between credit quality and liquidity and so, the liquidity
e¤ect could be implicit in the issuer rating or the coupon bond.45
<Table VI about here>
VII Robustness Tests and Extensions
In this section, we perform some robustness tests and extensions.46 First, we analyze
the e¤ect on results of a periodic liquidation of positions every quarter. Then, we test
how the results are a¤ected by the introduction of some market frictions. We also repeat
the analysis by allowing the standard deviation parameter to evolve as a GARCH process.
Finally, we study whether a change in the limit of acceptable losses, which had been set
at 25,000 Euros, has any inuence on the previous results. We comment the results under
45We have employed as liquidity proxies: the number of 5-year CDS missing trading prices during
the corresponding period, the logarithm of the bond issued amount, the number of issued bonds by the
underlying company, the bond time-to-maturity (in years) and the bond age (in years). The CDS liquidity
measure presents more missing trading prices during the crisis.
46Detailed results of the robustness tests and extensions are available on request.
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the model that best ts the data according to AIC and SC.
A Closing Positions
The investor positions were not closed in the previous analysis since future losses are
perfectly known at the current moment if no default occurs. CDSs transfer credit risk
from one party to another and it is possible that the investors only want exposure to risk
for a limited period of time. These investors could liquidate their positions at a given
price if there is an adequate level of liquidity in this OTC market. Thus, we analyze the
same strategy but closing, at the end of every quarter, any investment made during that
quarter under the assumption that both CDSs and asset swaps positions can be closed at
the same time.47 Positions are closed whenever the basis (sAt  
_
st) is negative to avoid
closing positions at dates when an important and certain loss would take place. If the
basis is positive at a given date, the positions will be closed on the rst subsequent date
when the basis is negative. However, if investors close a high number of positions at a
given date, it would lead to a large payment a quarter after that date which is derived
from the closed positions. It a¤ects the mean and variance growth rates. The number
of arbitrage opportunities decreases to seven during the period before crisis (Bouygues I,
Louis Vuitton II, Renault, Saint Gobain IV, Sodexho, Stora Enso, Technip and Tesco II)
and increases to ten during the crisis period (British AM. Tob. II, Casino III, Edison,
Kingsher, KPN, Repsol, SES, Telekom Austria, Teliasonera and Union Fenosa).
47Note that it is easier to get into credit derivatives contracts than it is to get out of them. This is
partly due to the fact that the maturity is set at a given horizon for CDSs and one can take the other
side of the nearest maturity contract and build a book of o¤setting positions, or try and sell the current
contract.
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B Market Frictions Analysis
The strategy is developed assuming the absence of borrowing spreads and transaction
costs. This assumption could be acceptable during the period before crisis but it seems
less feasible during the crisis. Thus, we also measure the impact of market frictions such
as transactions costs and higher borrowing costs. In those cases, the basis is usually
lower. For the rst subperiod analyzed in this paper, if the sum of transaction costs and
borrowing spreads is greater than 2 b.p. the statistical arbitrage opportunities disappear
in British AM Tob. II, Louis Vuitton I, Repsol YPF, Reuters and Technip. When they
are greater than 3 b.p., the same is true for Altadis, Casino I and II and Compass Group.
Ditto for 4 b.p. in Edison and Renault and in PRR and Tesco II for 5 b.p.. Finally, the
statistical arbitrage opportunity found in Sodexho remains until costs exceed 7 b.p.. In
order to have a better perspective of these costs, the average ASP, bond and CDS spread
during the period before the crisis is around 25 b.p. and, so, a cost of 3 b.p. is around
12% of the credit spread. In the crisis period, we nd that if the sum of the transaction
costs and borrowing spreads is greater than 1 b.p., the statistical arbitrage opportunities
disappear in SES, Telecom Italia II and Telekom Austria. When they are greater than 2
b.p., the same is true for Casino III and Edison. Ditto for 3 b.p. in Bayer, British AM.
Tob. II and Teliasonera and in KPN for 6 b.p..
C Trade Size Analysis
We employ CDSs with a notional equal to e500,000 and assume that the strategy
stops if the total investment in a given bond exceeds 25% of the bonds issued amount or
if the total expected future losses exceed e25,000. The reason for using this notional is to
guarantee a substantial number of investments to test the existence of persistent anomalies
in credit markets. However, as in some execution platforms for CDSs the minimum trade
size if of e1 million, we repeat the analysis employing CDSs of this notional value and
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increasing the barrier of losses to e50,000. In the rst subperiod we nd two additional
statistical arbitrage opportunities: Bouygues I and Louis Vuitton II. In the crisis period
we nd an additional statistical arbitrage opportunity: Union Fenosa.
D Non-Constant Variance Parameter
Although the standard deviation parameter of the prots process, ; was assumed
to be constant, it could evolve as a GARCH process. We have repeated the analysis
by letting the standard deviation parameter evolve as a GARCH. Results do not change
signicantly.
E Limit of Losses Analysis
The barrier of 25,000 Euros for the total expected losses which determine the point at
which the strategy stops could seem to be an arbitrary limit. For this reason, we repeated
the test with barriers of 10,000 and 50,000 Euros and with no barrier under both UM and
CM models. Results conrm that a barrier of 10,000 Euros seems too low given that it
could lead to stopping the strategy prematurely. However, a barrier of 50,000 Euros leads
to the same results as using a limit of 25,000 Euros for both subperiods. Finally, if the
strategy does not stop independently of the investors losses, we only nd one additional
statistical arbitrage opportunity for Tesco I under the CM model in the rst subperiod
and none under the UM model. As the preferred model for Tesco I is UM, we conclude
that the last alternative does not lead to additional statistical arbitrage opportunities and
moreover its use would involve a high risk.
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VIII Conclusions
The ongoing nancial crisis and its possible consequences for the regulation of nancial
markets makes the study of the possible persistent mispricing in credit derivatives markets
a topic of salient relevance.
We make ve contributions to this important topic. First, we present a new test of
statistical arbitrage allowing for more general structure in the innovations and with lower
Type I error than existing alternatives. Second, we apply the new test to a specic segment
of the credit derivatives markets: CDS and ASP. We also apply cointegration techniques
to the same problem. Our third contribution relates to the appropriate way of testing
for arbitrage opportunities. We focus our analysis to test the cases where long positions
in CDSs and ASPs are needed. Fourth, we employ four di¤erent databases to document
that during the period before the subprime crisis, in 26% of the cases there are long-run
arbitrage opportunities and in 24% there are statistical arbitrage opportunities. On the
other hand, during the crisis we nd 8% of cases of long-run arbitrage and 19% of statistical
arbitrage. In this second period, we nd a lower average basis, a higher correlation between
credit spreads and a higher volatility in the basis and the credit spreads. Finally, we show
that statistical arbitrage opportunities seem to be more frequent when the asset swaps
packages contain relatively low-rated bonds with a high-coupon rate.
Our results may be interpreted as tentative evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
some persistent mispricings can be found in this segment of the credit derivatives markets.
Looking forward, we expect more denite evidence on other arbitrage strategies as well as
in other market segments. The new test and the procedure (long positions only) of this
paper can also be applied to other nancial markets and instruments.
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the rating at the end of the first subperiod, which spans from November 2005 to
August 2007, and at the end of the second subperiod, which covers the subprime
crisis and spans from August 2007 to June 2009. Panel B provides descriptive
spreads and splits into two panels, Panel C1 and Panel C2, corresponding to the
for the basis, which is defined as the difference between ASP and CDS spreads,
during the first subperiod (Panel D1) and the second one (Panel D2). Panels E1
and E2 report the descriptive statistics of the CDS spreads for the four different
databases in the first and second subperiod, respectively.
Issuer Rating Sector
Akzo Nobel A- / BBB+ Chemicals
Altadis BBB / - Beverages & Tobacco
Astrazeneca  - / AA- Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Auchan  - / A Retail - Department Stores
BASF  - / A+ Chemicals
Bayer  - / A- Chemicals
Belgacom  - / A+ Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
BMW A+ / A Automobile
Bouygues BBB+ / BBB+ Construction
British AM Tob. BBB+ / BBB+ Beverages & Tobacco
Carrefour A / A Food & Drug Retailers
Casino G. P. BBB- / BBB- Food & Drug Retailers
Compass Group BBB+ / - Support Services
Edison BBB+ / BBB+ Public Utilities
Enel A- / A- Public Utilities
Energias de Portugal A- / A- Electricity
E.ON A+ / - Utilities
France Telecom A- / A- Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
Iberdrola A / A- Petrol and Power
Kingfisher BBB- / BBB- General Retailers
Koninklijke KPN BBB+ / BBB+ Telecommunication Services
Louis Vuitton BBB+ / BBB+ Other Textiles and Leather Goods
Philips  - / A- Electronic & Electrical Equipment
PPR BBB- / BBB- Retailers - Multi Department
Reed Elsevier A- / - Media & Entertainment
Renault BBB+ / - Automobiles
Repsol YPF BBB+ / BBB+ Petrol and Power
Reuters A- / - Publishing
Saint Gobain BBB+ / BBB+ Building and Construction Materials
Scania A- / - Machinery and Engineering
Schneider  - / A- Electrical Equipment
SES BBB / BBB Telecommunications
Siemens AA- / A+ Industrial
Sodexho BBB+ / - Business Support Services
Stora Enso BBB- / - Forest Product & Paper
Technip BBB / BBB Oil - Services
Telecom Italia BBB+ / BBB Public Utilities
Telefonica BBB+ / A- Technology and Telecommunications
Telekom Austria BBB+ / BBB+ Machinery, Transport and Technology
Teliasonera  - / A- Telecommunications
Tesco A / A- Food & Drug Retailers
Thales A- / A- Defence
Thyssenkrupp BBB+ / BBB- Industrial
Union Fenosa A- / A- Petrol and Power
Veolia Environ. BBB+ / - Water
Vinci BBB+ / - Other Construction
Vivendi BBB / - Subscription Entertainment Networks
Vodafone A- / - Wireless Telecomunications Svs.
Volkswagen A- / BBB+ Automobile
Volvo A- / BBB+ Machinery & Engineering
first and second subperiod, respectively. Panel D reports descriptive statistics
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Panel A describes the rating and sector of the CDS and bond issuer. We report
one (Panel B2). Panel C includes descriptive statistics for ASP, bond and CDS
statistics for bonds during the first subperiod (Panel B1) and during the second
45
Amount issued
(millions of euros) Mean Max Min
Akzo Nobel I 750 220 4.250 100.03 101.36 98.31
Akzo Nobel II 1,000 286 5.625 103.94 106.95 101.96
Altadis 600 330 4.250 100.32 102.59 99.30
BMW 750 295 3.875 98.63 100.02 96.50
Bouygues I 750 197 4.625 101.40 104.00 98.76
Bouyges II 1,000 221 5.875 104.64 107.97 101.79
British AM Tob. I 1,700 338 4.875 101.86 104.58 100.00
British AM Tob. II 1,000 232 4.375 99.61 101.07 97.53
Carrefour I 1,100 221 4.375 100.22 101.96 97.91
Carrefour II 1,000 314 6.125 107.15 111.98 103.26
Casino G. P. I 400 148 4.750 99.98 101.36 97.80
Casino G. P. II 500 195 5.250 102.18 103.97 100.01
Compass Group 300 121 6.000 104.08 106.40 101.97
Edison 700 339 5.125 103.43 106.91 100.51
Enel 750 91 4.125 99.22 100.95 96.99
Energias de Portugal I 1,000 184 6.400 107.40 111.13 103.77
Energias de Portugal II 747.352 162 5.875 106.80 108.90 103.07
E.ON 4,250 200 5.750 104.44 108.20 101.61
France Telecom I 750 119 4.625 99.77 101.48 97.82
France Telecom II 1,000 100 4.375 98.48 100.26 96.89
France Telecom III 1,000 294 3.000 95.82 98.74 94.34
Iberdrola I 750 234 4.375 98.35 103.68 100.71
Iberdrola II 600 195 4.500 101.36 103.60 99.64
Kingfisher 500 270 4.500 100.11 102.13 98.00
Koninklijke KPN 1,425 221 4.500 99.18 100.54 97.21
Louis Vuitton I 600 251 4.625 100.85 102.44 98.75
Louis Vuitton II 750 352 5.000 102.69 105.87 100.28
PPR 800 289 5.250 102.71 104.58 99.79
Reed Elsevier 500 208 5.000 102.68 105.61 100.89
Renault 1,000 249 6.125 104.53 106.59 102.29
Repsol YPF 1,175 298 6.000 105.68 110.12 102.50
Reuters 500 229 4.625 101.23 105.38 98.91
Saint Gobain I 1,000 316 4.750 101.46 104.10 99.80
Saint Gobain II 1,100 261 4.250 99.03 100.60 97.00
Saint Gobain III 1,000 337 5.000 102.55 106.34 100.09
Saint Gobain IV 150 273 6.250 101.00 103.00 99.74
Scania 600 219 3.625 97.36 99.97 95.65
SES 500 52 3.875 100.78 101.96 99.55
Siemens 2,000 72 5.750 105.55 108.13 102.85
Sodexho 1,000 350 5.875 104.09 107.10 101.64
Stora Enso 500 316 3.250 96.31 94.71 98.36
Technip 650 112 4.625 100.97 102.30 98.52
Telecom Italia I 750 300 4.500 99.88 102.78 97.75
Telecom Italia II 2,000 269 7.250 110.40 113.22 106.55
Telefonica 2,250 317 3.750 97.41 99.34 95.65
Telekom Austria 500 137 3.375 97.40 99.05 96.27
Tesco I 750 347 4.750 102.18 105.92 99.66
Tesco II 500 303 3.875 98.67 100.15 96.60
Thales 500 111 4.375 100.17 101.76 97.91
Thyssenkrupp 750 235 5.000 101.73 103.06 99.46
Union Fenosa 500 317 5.000 103.00 106.84 100.16
Veolia Environ. 2,000 239 5.875 103.20 106.50 100.92
Vinci 1,025 158 5.875 104.73 108.47 101.87
Vivendi 630 97 3.625 97.85 100.50 96.50
Vodafone 1,900 311 5.125 100.22 102.35 98.90
Volkswagen 1,000 255 4.125 98.93 100.32 97.05
Volvo 300 324 5.375 103.79 107.64 101.17
Average 938.64 236 4.862 101.53 103.99 99.45
Panel B1
Issuer Observations Coupon (%) Price
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Amount issued
(millions of euros) Mean Max Min
Akzo Nobel I 750 396 4.250 99.26 102.70 96.25
Astrazeneca 750 157 4.625 100.68 103.74 97.68
Auchan 600 169 3.000 96.69 98.49 95.35
BASF 1,400 290 3.375 97.44 102.39 93.73
Bayer 2,000 347 6.000 104.55 108.38 99.72
Belgacom 775 38 4.125 98.06 102.23 95.65
BMW 750 393 3.875 98.00 101.65 88.64
Bouygues I 750 260 4.625 99.79 104.05 97.05
British AM Tob. II 1,000 300 4.375 98.92 103.37 95.19
Carrefour I 1,100 324 4.375 100.24 104.98 96.94
Carrefour II 1,000 324 6.125 103.45 105.10 101.10
Casino G. P. I 400 304 4.750 98.34 103.37 94.37
Casino G. P. II 500 304 5.250 100.59 102.89 98.46
Casino G. P. III 700 304 6.000 100.74 104.67 94.33
Edison 700 338 5.125 101.31 104.21 92.69
Enel 750 206 4.125 100.23 103.75 96.75
Energias de Portugal I 1,000 258 6.400 102.17 104.26 100.09
Energias de Portugal II 747 251 5.875 103.41 106.10 99.60
France Telecom I 750 298 4.625 100.75 104.96 96.54
France Telecom II 1,000 298 4.375 99.49 104.57 94.50
France Telecom III 1,000 298 3.000 97.73 101.70 94.69
Iberdrola I 750 291 4.375 100.06 103.05 97.40
Kingfisher 500 146 4.500 95.27 98.91 89.01
Koninklijke KPN 1,425 398 4.500 98.70 103.60 93.60
Louis Vuitton I 600 368 4.625 100.25 104.92 97.28
Louis Vuitton II 750 369 5.000 100.93 103.24 98.63
Philips 750 237 6.125 104.46 106.45 101.34
PPR 800 339 5.250 98.71 102.80 91.83
Repsol YPF 1,175 358 6.000 102.02 103.91 99.12
Saint Gobain II 1,100 384 4.250 97.11 101.96 91.18
Saint Gobain III 1,000 384 5.000 100.15 102.12 97.79
Schneider 900 110 3.125 96.11 100.92 94.29
SES 500 119 3.875 96.77 101.50 93.36
Siemens 2,000 228 5.750 103.86 106.75 100.23
Technip 650 194 4.625 98.97 102.95 95.83
Telecom Italia I 750 299 4.500 98.35 102.31 89.08
Telecom Italia II 2,000 299 7.250 104.28 108.05 96.45
Telefonica 2,250 272 3.750 97.89 102.50 94.03
Telekom Austria 500 255 3.375 98.36 100.86 96.52
Teliasonera 500 383 3.625 95.65 101.73 91.46
Tesco I 750 276 4.750 100.85 103.69 98.76
Tesco II 500 286 3.875 98.74 103.27 95.88
Thales 500 298 4.375 99.95 103.66 93.97
Thyssenkrupp 750 358 5.000 100.52 105.13 92.51
Union Fenosa 500 288 5.000 100.92 103.20 98.28
Volkswagen 1,000 400 4.125 98.01 101.63 91.65
Volvo 300 327 5.375 99.86 102.62 94.79
Average 885.58 287.72 4.69 99.76 103.39 95.61
Panel B2
Issuer Observations Coupon (%) Price
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CDS vs AS
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Corr
Akzo Nobel I 23.55 17.14 30.72 2.31 17.66 3.80 35.60 8.25 19.29 4.50 37.40 8.43 0.48
Akzo Nobel II 14.11 9.85 27.89 3.47 17.17 4.90 28.80 5.57 18.26 5.60 30.80 5.49 0.72
Altadis 16.83 8.59 35.00 6.36 20.91 9.90 37.50 5.84 23.49 12.30 39.50 5.66 0.33
BMW 12.10 6.61 23.86 4.77 10.49 2.10 18.70 3.69 12.03 4.30 20.60 3.80 0.72
Bouygues I 21.10 12.00 35.00 5.81 25.52 11.50 39.30 6.56 26.93 12.80 41.30 6.55 0.70
Bouygues II 20.24 11.94 33.60 6.35 15.80 4.00 28.10 5.33 16.91 6.10 29.70 5.08 0.79
British AM Tob. I 24.81 6.05 54.00 13.18 20.20 3.00 45.90 9.31 22.01 3.20 47.80 9.05 0.88
British AM Tob. II 24.89 13.12 40.00 6.96 32.99 16.19 54.10 8.86 35.03 20.00 57.00 9.01 0.90
Carrefour I 16.19 9.43 38.63 4.58 18.75 8.17 31.20 5.13 20.35 9.70 31.90 5.17 0.20
Carrefour II 12.87 6.80 28.05 3.51 7.45 1.20 22.80 3.90 8.30 1.20 23.20 3.87 0.61
Casino I 48.03 31.05 76.51 8.67 55.06 33.70 77.20 9.87 57.60 36.90 79.80 9.83 0.68
Casino II 45.02 22.31 122.71 24.22 49.67 17.30 126.10 25.99 51.29 19.30 128.20 25.78 0.95
Compass Group 22.99 10.80 83.29 15.59 31.36 4.53 94.00 18.18 32.42 6.20 93.40 17.70 0.94
Edison 16.90 6.52 30.40 5.30 23.93 10.20 32.80 5.71 24.97 10.80 34.10 5.53 0.76
Enel 15.51 8.98 38.05 5.73 13.50 2.40 29.84 6.61 14.93 4.00 30.30 6.95 0.71
Energias de Portugal I 12.30 6.37 23.65 4.92 12.11 1.80 19.60 3.18 19.93 2.20 19.90 3.02 0.47
Energias de Portugal II 14.80 8.46 28.00 4.93 16.72 3.24 24.20 3.49 17.41 5.00 24.00 3.07 0.54
E.ON 10.87 5.02 15.46 2.63 9.47 2.10 18.60 3.63 10.58 2.50 19.40 3.67 0.50
France Telecom I 21.25 14.56 39.39 4.31 25.22 18.80 44.01 4.75 27.45 21.00 48.50 5.34 0.73
France Telecom II 21.39 15.00 40.57 4.64 25.36 19.30 38.99 4.20 27.53 20.90 43.40 4.68 0.88
France Telecom III 25.15 10.68 50.03 10.18 17.46 4.10 30.00 6.82 19.68 6.50 32.70 7.28 0.81
Iberdrola I 16.63 6.82 27.97 5.00 16.78 3.30 28.70 5.39 19.48 5.40 30.10 5.23 0.65
Iberdrola II 11.70 6.00 18.40 3.09 10.77 2.50 17.00 2.47 12.30 7.50 19.90 2.49 0.36
Kingfisher 44.81 31.99 80.96 8.85 49.22 29.10 71.80 9.07 51.53 31.90 74.20 8.89 0.81
Koninklijke KPN 47.20 31.74 73.82 10.68 52.78 29.50 79.80 12.81 55.61 33.30 83.70 12.95 0.96
Louis Vuitton I 19.26 9.09 29.19 5.45 23.04 10.30 38.70 7.77 24.61 11.70 41.40 7.85 0.87
Louis Vuitton II 16.40 5.86 27.07 6.22 21.62 4.06 31.20 7.14 22.98 5.40 33.50 7.04 0.93
PPR 39.60 25.73 72.88 6.89 47.98 30.10 60.90 6.79 49.47 32.80 63.70 6.65 0.74
Reed Elsevier 13.83 8.67 28.18 4.03 12.57 4.80 21.10 3.25 14.84 8.00 23.50 2.87 0.48
Renault 16.85 5.05 30.80 6.69 22.29 5.00 43.90 9.10 23.15 6.07 45.40 9.02 0.93
Repsol YPF 21.08 9.69 36.24 7.15 26.49 10.40 37.90 7.73 27.17 13.02 38.50 7.26 0.80
Reuters 17.75 9.13 31.78 5.64 23.42 6.68 34.20 6.55 24.92 8.70 35.30 6.49 0.81
Saint Gobain I 18.10 10.13 31.77 4.64 17.36 6.30 28.30 5.19 18.84 7.30 29.80 5.29 0.65
Saint Gobain II 26.86 15.93 47.58 6.86 31.75 16.90 49.60 8.42 33.96 19.90 52.70 8.57 0.89
Saint Gobain III 22.78 11.65 38.06 7.23 26.75 9.60 39.00 8.15 28.07 11.80 40.40 7.93 0.81
Saint Gobain IV 16.20 11.04 27.47 3.57 21.58 5.55 31.77 4.82 22.19 5.00 31.40 6.26 0.52
Scania 24.69 10.31 41.00 8.58 23.53 8.60 38.20 7.46 25.79 10.20 41.30 7.66 0.53
SES 20.92 14.28 26.18 3.16 21.42 11.02 28.30 4.82 23.95 16.20 30.90 4.14 0.65
Siemens 12.08 9.35 17.00 1.58 9.60 4.94 13.50 1.81 10.61 6.60 14.40 1.63 -0.04
Sodexho 9.98 4.45 25.89 4.56 18.90 3.39 34.40 5.56 20.21 6.30 34.60 5.11 0.81
Stora Enso 38.10 21.18 88.19 13.38 40.27 21.30 62.30 12.15 43.66 24.60 64.80 12.66 0.91
Technip 24.55 15.79 34.93 3.61 33.84 20.60 41.40 4.17 35.57 21.90 45.10 4.29 0.17
Telecom Italia I 44.46 23.01 71.60 10.27 46.49 20.90 84.80 11.94 48.87 24.00 87.00 12.02 0.92
Telecom Italia II 45.95 24.40 75.40 10.85 45.34 22.00 64.30 10.64 44.46 23.70 62.80 9.65 0.87
Telefonica 33.40 16.46 59.20 8.87 36.77 17.70 57.90 9.32 39.55 20.20 60.10 9.59 0.93
Telekom Austria 24.04 9.55 64.27 12.71 25.57 11.32 51.60 9.61 28.00 11.70 55.20 9.95 0.94
Tesco I 9.45 4.06 21.63 4.81 12.09 1.70 24.60 5.06 13.35 2.50 25.90 5.03 0.52
Tesco II 10.38 5.00 22.95 4.36 14.46 2.30 29.30 5.99 16.10 3.30 30.60 6.17 0.77
Thales 13.98 9.31 19.08 3.19 18.63 6.74 27.40 5.39 20.21 8.60 28.70 5.35 0.74
Thyssenkrupp 35.04 17.12 68.64 12.85 36.92 9.80 75.90 18.28 38.63 12.10 78.70 18.30 0.96
Union Fenosa 20.74 7.29 38.08 7.63 25.07 7.86 36.10 6.47 26.28 9.00 35.50 6.29 0.89
Veolia Environ. 10.70 5.03 21.04 4.00 11.50 5.40 17.40 2.80 13.47 5.40 19.30 2.91 -0.05
Vinci 23.96 12.26 38.82 7.08 23.16 10.62 35.00 6.05 24.14 10.10 34.50 5.82 0.72
Vivendi 34.30 17.70 55.20 8.30 38.95 18.40 51.40 9.18 41.97 23.40 56.40 9.33 0.90
Vodafone 15.31 10.93 24.78 3.28 12.25 4.00 25.90 7.10 14.04 0.20 29.70 7.23 0.78
Volkswagen 21.21 10.82 37.60 6.33 23.61 6.97 37.60 8.11 25.52 7.50 40.40 8.30 0.77
Volvo 20.86 9.80 35.07 6.77 21.92 4.54 40.90 8.08 23.03 6.00 43.40 7.93 0.74
Average 22.53 12.24 41.82 6.78 24.76 10.11 41.57 7.36 26.54 11.86 43.43 7.35 0.70
Panel C1
CDS Premium (basis points) Asset Swap Spread (b.p.) Bond Spread (b.p.)
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CDS vs AS
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Corr
Akzo Nobel I 65.19 13.58 172.60 42.68 72.45 3.17 254.30 69.83 73.77 0.30 304.70 72.63 0.91
Astrazeneca 51.12 16.53 170.83 32.64 40.94 16.31 169.50 25.25 40.61 15.10 154.70 23.51 0.77
Auchan 27.82 8.62 68.00 12.04 37.37 1.09 145.40 34.79 34.19 1.02 132.00 28.01 0.73
BASF 64.26 14.37 159.37 41.23 36.69 2.30 119.20 31.94 35.32 2.00 125.30 31.74 0.78
Bayer 64.72 20.42 137.87 27.24 87.10 27.43 202.70 40.64 84.96 26.50 286.20 40.75 0.85
Belgacom 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 46.44 14.00 103.90 15.58 47.95 11.80 102.10 16.03 0.57
BMW 144.24 12.83 537.50 143.93 99.04 1.10 479.00 102.82 101.42 1.30 515.40 106.08 0.86
Bouygues I 102.76 23.00 270.32 67.01 101.66 16.73 262.10 65.28 99.20 16.70 263.50 64.47 0.91
British AM Tob. II 67.14 19.16 173.66 32.03 107.03 27.40 293.10 60.43 109.13 25.30 298.20 61.14 0.72
Carrefour I 49.82 13.89 153.67 28.23 52.93 1.00 174.60 42.99 50.76 2.00 174.20 41.51 0.83
Carrefour II 47.49 11.14 159.47 31.39 30.89 2.81 116.30 19.42 31.18 2.40 137.40 24.21 0.28
Casino I 142.33 38.24 390.00 75.60 172.53 58.08 389.70 95.31 177.10 59.50 418.30 99.07 0.90
Casino II 130.09 26.59 390.00 81.10 111.67 19.89 284.90 61.22 115.18 17.90 292.90 69.88 0.53
Casino III 146.96 45.32 390.00 73.33 208.31 64.89 456.20 110.23 211.57 64.60 489.80 114.06 0.88
Edison 65.48 16.87 198.00 52.92 82.27 6.30 215.50 62.45 81.05 4.80 218.80 59.79 0.87
Enel 178.55 23.43 743.31 166.70 53.71 0.20 146.00 39.91 53.71 0.80 150.10 40.08 0.80
Energias de Portugal I 73.52 17.11 205.52 50.81 53.74 1.50 165.00 37.86 52.70 0.40 167.34 38.64 0.67
Energias de Portugal II 82.34 21.48 190.27 45.93 100.71 4.94 244.90 65.18 98.78 4.90 247.70 65.40 0.81
France Telecom I 64.58 21.74 121.87 26.03 74.94 23.70 193.10 38.64 72.99 3.30 187.00 37.58 0.67
France Telecom II 64.98 21.96 121.65 25.90 87.54 35.12 209.80 39.49 88.27 32.10 211.60 38.92 0.78
France Telecom III 59.48 17.98 122.00 26.99 50.08 5.80 195.00 32.83 49.27 6.00 189.50 30.67 0.66
Iberdrola I 92.62 13.12 295.50 57.70 75.65 0.91 211.00 56.40 74.15 1.50 218.30 55.43 0.90
Kingfisher 191.71 46.30 435.00 101.87 218.77 41.00 376.50 109.45 232.37 43.30 407.50 119.06 0.84
Koninklijke KPN 72.20 25.16 159.51 28.04 113.57 38.53 321.60 54.66 118.22 36.80 348.10 58.81 0.71
Louis Vuitton I 71.15 15.74 246.00 50.72 70.56 11.09 200.90 47.50 69.89 12.00 201.30 47.31 0.90
Louis Vuitton II 65.95 11.55 246.00 54.05 62.37 1.13 234.20 49.06 61.37 1.20 211.70 48.38 0.88
Philips 59.31 13.80 162.66 34.89 65.24 5.07 197.00 58.26 63.13 6.00 194.60 56.32 0.87
PPR 252.50 49.20 759.03 199.38 200.16 35.18 553.70 144.48 205.98 36.10 590.60 151.84 0.97
Repsol YPF 115.13 21.18 441.16 111.58 107.20 18.21 368.40 87.01 106.35 13.40 391.90 88.56 0.91
Saint Gobain II 177.26 25.63 555.63 134.35 158.10 38.24 458.10 111.38 162.70 41.10 496.70 115.75 0.92
Saint Gobain III 156.89 19.87 522.04 132.37 110.95 22.78 323.10 72.01 117.41 23.10 366.30 85.89 0.85
Schneider 68.66 17.59 199.78 42.03 70.63 12.64 252.60 34.20 73.11 11.70 232.50 34.13 0.85
SES 77.35 24.58 181.86 41.73 122.23 30.11 352.30 83.71 127.17 30.80 369.60 87.52 0.88
Siemens 76.03 13.98 238.85 56.55 62.58 3.00 175.60 47.26 61.59 3.00 171.40 46.51 0.77
Technip 98.66 16.83 302.73 80.09 109.91 24.42 303.50 83.61 114.41 18.50 314.90 89.36 0.76
Telecom Italia I 183.38 30.18 546.17 138.43 158.12 38.94 434.70 95.31 171.65 36.10 654.50 118.10 0.84
Telecom Italia II 184.89 30.95 540.33 136.07 216.49 38.01 536.70 148.10 215.13 36.50 552.30 149.77 0.97
Telefonica 97.99 25.54 247.69 54.96 102.31 31.61 276.10 56.25 103.94 32.80 278.00 56.46 0.90
Telekom Austria 59.18 13.71 142.58 30.07 93.66 12.43 326.80 62.25 99.57 9.40 321.90 64.89 0.68
Teliasonera 62.75 18.82 127.51 25.89 82.56 0.00 259.30 62.00 86.10 0.00 270.40 64.48 0.86
Tesco I 59.59 8.94 182.00 52.12 63.17 1.93 246.30 61.63 62.76 1.73 239.70 60.91 0.79
Tesco II 64.20 11.19 182.19 49.32 67.64 2.43 189.70 53.60 66.84 2.10 197.40 53.13 0.91
Thales 78.50 12.70 300.99 60.90 74.07 0.70 211.10 67.53 77.81 0.64 557.20 78.43 0.58
Thyssenkrupp 192.95 25.52 580.00 166.28 106.84 0.30 313.30 96.80 114.43 0.10 327.00 101.68 0.87
Union Fenosa 88.40 13.73 382.50 82.13 89.31 6.30 215.80 65.98 86.99 5.60 213.30 63.84 0.79
Volkswagen 132.69 18.92 360.02 91.15 119.99 17.44 352.20 94.58 123.23 17.70 363.40 96.96 0.89
Volvo 219.66 16.24 733.80 234.40 252.10 0.20 777.80 271.29 263.15 1.00 857.90 290.67 0.96
Average 100.71 20.50 298.67 71.23 99.62 16.30 282.73 69.50 101.46 15.34 306.71 72.09 0.80
Panel C2
CDS Premium (basis points) Asset Swap Spread (b.p.) Bond Spread (b.p.)
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Issuer Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I -5.89 -20.04 10.21 7.43
Akzo Nobel II 3.06 -7.51 11.51 3.92
Altadis 3.57 -14.29 16.19 7.09
BMW -1.61 -15.77 8.49 3.31
Bouygues I 4.41 -7.42 13.43 4.87
Bouygues II -4.43 -22.81 3.00 3.88
British AM Tob. I -4.61 -26.30 10.90 6.65
British AM Tob. II 8.10 -7.18 15.10 4.04
Carrefour I 2.56 -26.95 15.53 6.15
Carrefour II -5.42 -21.84 4.10 3.28
Casino I 7.04 -27.10 17.56 7.46
Casino II 4.66 -27.15 16.25 7.98
Compass Group 8.37 -14.26 20.86 6.44
Edison 7.03 -15.85 15.74 3.84
Enel -2.01 -19.47 5.89 4.81
Energias de Portugal I -0.18 -10.00 7.59 4.44
Energias de Portugal II 1.91 -14.88 9.05 4.22
E.ON -1.41 -9.36 9.08 3.24
France Telecom I 3.97 -6.25 14.46 3.36
France Telecom II 3.97 -6.32 7.99 2.17
France Telecom III -7.68 -30.40 0.53 6.19
Iberdrola I 0.15 -11.47 12.10 4.40
Iberdrola II -0.93 -8.61 6.31 3.18
Kingfisher 0.41 -43.52 10.18 5.55
Koninklijke KPN 5.59 -6.34 13.92 4.07
Louis Vuitton I 3.78 -16.28 13.70 4.03
Louis Vuitton II 3.22 -6.21 10.34 2.60
PPR 8.38 -23.05 16.78 4.92
Reed Elsevier -1.26 -11.96 5.94 3.77
Renault 5.43 -7.00 21.04 3.75
Repsol YPF 5.41 -11.79 17.12 4.77
Reuters 5.67 -8.30 15.08 3.85
Saint Gobain I -0.74 -21.91 9.16 4.17
Saint Gobain II 4.89 -16.54 14.34 3.96
Saint Gobain III 3.97 -16.68 14.70 4.79
Saint Gobain IV 5.37 -11.33 14.23 4.26
Scania -1.17 -19.60 14.03 7.88
SES 0.42 -9.91 5.59 3.70
Siemens -2.48 -10.89 2.56 2.45
Sodexho 8.92 -5.86 15.52 3.27
Stora Enso 2.17 -33.44 11.16 5.54
Technip 9.30 -12.92 19.33 5.03
Telecom Italia I 2.03 -13.60 17.54 4.69
Telecom Italia II -0.61 -11.77 18.98 5.54
Telefonica 3.37 -15.80 12.72 3.51
Telekom Austria 1.53 -17.34 8.82 5.03
Tesco I 2.64 -10.02 12.06 4.86
Tesco II 4.08 -12.61 13.15 3.81
Thales 4.64 -9.70 13.73 3.74
Thyssenkrupp 1.87 -19.24 15.79 6.88
Union Fenosa 4.32 -7.49 10.88 3.53
Veolia Environ 0.86 -9.87 9.87 4.97
Vinci -0.80 -16.18 9.03 4.98
Vivendi 4.66 -6.54 18.36 4.06
Vodafone -3.05 -15.04 7.93 4.97
Volkswagen 2.40 -27.12 11.22 5.14
Volvo 1.06 -17.49 13.48 5.48
Average 2.12 -15.34 12.11 4.66
Panel D1
Basis (b.p.)
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Issuer Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I 7.26 -53.23 117.83 35.69
Astrazeneca -10.19 -86.63 93.67 20.74
Auchan 9.55 -26.74 101.42 27.25
BASF -27.57 -123.71 21.75 25.80
Bayer 22.37 -43.90 112.97 22.69
Belgacom 5.56 -25.12 30.95 15.18
BMW -45.20 -356.80 273.54 76.37
Bouygues I -1.10 -58.90 101.42 28.11
British AM Tob. II 47.36 -16.35 202.58 44.59
Carrefour I 3.11 -50.27 120.18 25.26
Carrefour II -16.60 -145.87 73.84 31.96
Casino G. P. I 30.20 -55.30 170.01 42.99
Casino G. P. II -18.42 -315.10 112.15 71.18
Casino G. P. III 61.35 -31.73 218.98 57.14
Edison 16.79 -30.09 134.90 30.66
Enel -124.83 -656.01 20.97 136.64
Energias de Portugal I -9.78 -71.42 95.40 28.60
Energias de Portugal II 28.37 -72.24 155.44 42.72
France Telecom I 10.36 -64.55 94.61 28.52
France Telecom II 22.56 -38.73 110.98 25.33
France Telecom III -9.41 -79.81 103.03 25.32
Iberdrola I -16.97 -110.50 57.54 25.66
Kingfisher 27.06 -130.16 153.20 59.81
Koninklijke KPN 41.37 -25.61 212.95 40.11
Louis Vuitton I -0.59 -86.30 82.79 22.17
Louis Vuitton II -3.58 -91.90 135.19 26.22
Philips 5.93 -51.09 109.81 32.95
PPR -52.34 -340.83 60.54 70.35
Repsol YPF -7.93 -173.30 110.67 47.86
Saint Gobain II 0.84 -122.94 161.76 44.82
Saint Gobain III -31.94 -267.54 101.73 55.43
Schneider 1.97 -49.42 86.03 21.94
SES 44.88 -43.05 192.58 51.28
Siemens -13.46 -188.60 40.29 35.99
Technip 11.24 -167.69 127.37 56.59
Telecom Italia I -25.26 -356.17 84.10 78.72
Telecom Italia II 31.59 -34.29 168.70 34.92
Telefonica 4.31 -81.50 106.08 25.40
Telekom Austria 34.48 -31.41 239.45 47.33
Teliasonera 32.49 -20.96 181.59 36.83
Tesco I 3.59 -64.70 155.67 37.88
Tesco II 3.43 -43.35 100.88 22.78
Thales -4.43 -296.49 73.78 59.07
Thyssenkrupp -72.11 -326.40 80.24 89.82
Union Fenosa 12.91 -169.00 132.75 45.34
Volkswagen -12.70 -151.92 180.09 43.70
Volvo 32.44 -154.80 378.40 82.12
Average 1.04 -127.29 127.25 43.36
Panel D2
Basis (b.p.)
51
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I 23.55 17.14 30.72 2.31 23.39 15.40 41.80 3.68 22.98 14.55 49.90 4.10
Akzo Nobel II 14.11 9.85 27.89 3.47 12.57 6.31 25.30 3.95 12.93 5.46 31.33 4.45
Altadis 16.83 8.59 35.00 6.36 14.17 5.20 34.42 4.22 - - - -
BMW 12.10 6.61 23.86 4.77 11.98 6.28 26.11 4.80 11.66 5.11 26.82 4.92
Bouygues I 21.10 12.00 35.00 5.81 20.18 11.18 35.45 5.99 19.58 10.68 35.46 5.90
Bouygues II 20.24 11.94 33.60 6.35 20.01 11.45 33.15 6.02 19.22 10.38 35.14 6.01
British AM Tob. I 24.81 6.05 54.00 13.18 24.21 6.34 53.36 13.01 23.48 5.79 54.61 13.35
British AM Tob. II 24.89 13.12 40.00 6.96 24.38 14.51 38.73 6.18 23.96 12.12 36.72 6.48
Carrefour I 16.19 9.43 38.63 4.58 15.83 9.54 33.35 4.39 15.27 9.67 35.10 4.30
Carrefour II 12.87 6.80 28.05 3.51 12.67 6.80 23.20 3.54 12.84 6.82 30.78 3.97
Casino I 48.03 31.05 76.51 8.67 48.76 30.39 80.98 8.90 46.30 28.14 69.67 7.96
Casino II 45.02 22.31 122.71 24.22 44.97 20.26 122.98 24.35 42.33 16.81 124.43 25.45
Compass Group 22.99 10.80 83.29 15.59 24.05 11.19 80.48 14.62 22.33 9.88 80.93 14.86
Edison 16.90 6.52 30.40 5.30 15.94 6.36 28.38 5.04 15.91 5.64 28.87 5.32
Enel 15.51 8.98 38.05 5.73 15.32 9.39 36.99 5.36 14.64 8.40 33.27 5.42
Energias de Portugal I 12.30 6.37 23.65 4.92 11.37 4.43 20.87 4.36 11.59 4.96 22.70 4.97
Energias de Portugal II 14.80 8.46 28.00 4.93 14.26 7.40 27.50 4.83 14.57 8.69 26.22 4.08
E.ON 10.87 5.02 15.46 2.63 9.75 3.37 15.96 2.76 9.91 2.96 16.18 3.28
France Telecom I 21.25 14.56 39.39 4.31 21.90 15.73 43.61 4.48 20.85 14.60 40.45 4.17
France Telecom II 21.39 15.00 40.57 4.64 22.00 15.99 44.53 4.96 20.94 15.07 41.36 4.58
France Telecom III 25.15 10.68 50.03 10.18 25.12 11.05 49.58 9.84 24.51 10.29 49.29 10.18
Iberdrola I 16.63 6.82 27.97 5.00 16.06 8.17 27.87 4.74 16.56 7.84 27.81 4.92
Iberdrola II 11.70 6.00 18.40 3.09 10.57 6.05 18.89 3.00 10.58 4.48 20.39 3.61
Kingfisher 44.81 31.99 80.96 8.85 43.39 31.21 83.74 8.31 43.33 30.52 81.16 8.95
Koninklijke KPN 47.20 31.74 73.82 10.68 47.20 30.81 73.55 10.66 45.70 26.69 72.48 11.04
Louis Vuitton I 19.26 9.09 29.19 5.45 18.93 11.49 31.60 4.50 17.12 7.97 27.68 5.03
Louis Vuitton II 16.40 5.86 27.07 6.22 16.27 8.10 32.02 5.78 15.11 5.69 31.44 6.60
PPR 39.60 25.73 72.88 6.89 39.39 24.11 69.37 6.52 38.58 21.95 63.33 6.65
Reed Elsevier 13.83 8.67 28.18 4.03 8.92 5.61 24.61 3.09 7.59 3.52 29.28 3.28
Renault 16.85 5.05 30.80 6.69 17.20 6.85 29.85 5.34 15.68 6.05 29.27 5.54
Repsol YPF 21.08 9.69 36.24 7.15 20.81 10.14 40.99 7.03 21.25 9.52 43.77 8.16
Reuters 17.75 9.13 31.78 5.64 17.55 9.15 29.33 4.79 17.00 8.87 29.39 4.88
Saint Gobain I 18.10 10.13 31.77 4.64 15.87 8.34 28.59 5.21 14.90 4.29 32.66 5.90
Saint Gobain II 26.86 15.93 47.58 6.86 26.21 15.66 48.31 6.77 25.13 13.28 52.85 7.43
Saint Gobain III 22.78 11.65 38.06 7.23 21.62 11.09 34.22 6.83 20.51 8.15 40.03 7.68
Saint Gobain IV 16.20 11.04 27.47 3.57 14.62 10.34 25.46 3.43 14.23 10.14 28.19 3.27
Scania 24.69 10.31 41.00 8.58 23.90 11.11 40.50 7.78 22.46 9.94 38.53 7.71
SES 20.92 14.28 26.18 3.16 21.88 15.07 27.45 3.19 20.33 15.55 27.07 3.14
Siemens 12.08 9.35 17.00 1.58 11.26 8.50 16.07 1.82 10.98 7.49 16.46 1.97
Sodexho 9.98 4.45 25.89 4.56 10.05 4.51 23.83 3.86 - - - -
Stora Enso 38.10 21.18 88.19 13.38 36.55 20.79 73.32 11.71 34.90 16.47 99.83 14.20
Technip 24.55 15.79 34.93 3.61 22.82 13.98 28.30 2.53 22.00 10.89 26.68 2.91
Telecom Italia I 44.46 23.01 71.60 10.27 44.17 23.29 70.06 10.02 44.06 22.81 70.80 10.03
Telecom Italia II 45.95 24.40 75.40 10.85 45.88 24.90 74.26 10.65 45.69 23.93 74.02 10.55
Telefonica 33.40 16.46 59.20 8.87 32.45 15.82 57.05 9.06 31.73 15.44 56.67 9.15
Telekom Austria 24.04 9.55 64.27 12.71 23.91 9.19 60.32 11.48 23.20 8.99 62.40 12.21
Tesco I 9.45 4.06 21.63 4.81 9.74 3.80 22.28 4.69 10.47 4.94 20.87 4.42
Tesco II 10.38 5.00 22.95 4.36 11.07 5.42 22.50 4.38 11.42 6.09 22.35 4.01
Thales 13.98 9.31 19.08 3.19 14.22 9.77 23.05 3.10 14.31 10.19 22.47 2.98
Thyssenkrupp 35.04 17.12 68.64 12.85 33.76 16.59 64.20 12.35 32.72 14.96 61.79 12.54
Union Fenosa 20.74 7.29 38.08 7.63 21.15 8.30 35.56 6.99 21.69 9.22 34.86 7.11
Veolia Environ. 10.70 5.03 21.04 4.00 8.74 3.67 20.35 3.35 8.78 3.12 21.94 3.55
Vinci 23.96 12.26 38.82 7.08 20.48 10.08 32.71 6.12 19.81 7.54 37.90 7.84
Vivendi 34.30 17.70 55.20 8.30 32.49 17.06 47.89 7.25 32.25 17.76 50.12 7.85
Vodafone 15.31 10.93 24.78 3.28 14.02 8.62 22.85 3.69 12.70 7.50 78.08 5.07
Volkswagen 21.21 10.82 37.60 6.33 21.47 11.37 37.23 6.27 20.96 10.77 41.23 6.47
Volvo 20.86 9.80 35.07 6.77 20.50 8.69 33.77 6.45 18.84 7.80 34.08 6.67
Average 22.86 12.45 42.23 6.83 22.25 12.12 41.28 6.54 21.61 11.03 43.22 6.86
Panel E1
GFI CDS Premium (b.p.) CMA CDS Premium (b.p.) JPMorgan CDS Premium (b.p.)
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Panel E2
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I 65.19 13.58 172.60 42.68 68.28 13.97 179.18 46.97 68.86 13.58 189.58 48.77 66.15 12.70 200.50 43.36
Astrazeneca 51.12 16.53 170.83 32.64 43.85 14.94 151.87 35.36 47.78 16.53 162.13 38.51 - - - -
Auchan 27.82 8.62 68.00 12.04 26.39 9.33 59.06 10.66 30.45 8.62 83.37 16.05 32.89 10.56 100.16 17.00
BASF 64.26 14.37 159.37 41.23 69.65 14.22 183.67 49.02 66.28 14.37 155.00 44.42 67.70 13.47 180.66 46.22
Bayer 64.72 20.42 137.87 27.24 67.40 20.19 151.83 31.81 65.77 20.42 145.00 30.04 67.58 18.65 177.00 34.73
Belgacom 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 38.84 18.18 93.43 16.79 - - - -
BMW 144.24 12.83 537.50 143.93 147.89 14.47 537.88 144.01 148.77 0.01 607.12 148.52 147.68 11.87 558.53 145.91
Bouygues I 102.76 23.00 270.32 67.01 100.60 20.42 271.44 69.67 104.58 23.00 270.44 74.15 105.66 23.25 330.46 78.81
British AM Tob. II 67.14 19.16 173.66 32.03 67.65 19.96 175.64 33.76 67.84 19.16 197.07 37.61 69.46 18.40 195.15 36.91
Carrefour I 49.82 13.89 153.67 28.23 47.19 13.20 111.50 22.28 50.26 13.89 142.59 28.58 55.16 8.78 154.90 32.58
Carrefour II 47.49 11.14 159.47 31.39 41.78 9.30 99.42 24.55 46.64 11.14 150.45 32.30 52.18 7.52 166.25 34.73
Casino I 142.33 38.24 390.00 75.60 135.51 40.03 316.49 65.06 143.83 19.12 419.32 87.12 150.97 34.70 425.99 91.91
Casino II 130.09 26.59 390.00 81.10 112.60 26.61 267.23 60.19 135.61 26.59 450.48 98.85 137.72 21.87 438.15 102.39
Casino III 146.96 45.32 390.00 73.33 143.81 46.53 338.00 65.83 148.11 45.32 405.34 80.40 153.80 41.71 424.19 87.68
Edison 65.48 16.87 198.00 52.92 60.62 16.78 168.94 45.33 60.43 17.58 230.22 44.52 63.61 14.93 190.48 48.41
Enel 178.55 23.43 743.31 166.70 182.04 26.04 627.55 164.44 191.97 23.43 687.16 177.35 189.28 18.47 678.26 177.13
Energias de Portugal I 73.52 17.11 205.52 50.81 71.86 13.79 206.06 52.63 82.55 17.11 198.06 55.94 81.86 9.97 212.77 60.11
Energias de Portugal II 82.34 21.48 190.27 45.93 79.96 20.77 195.22 45.77 83.88 21.48 185.04 47.08 90.13 14.53 191.58 53.91
France Telecom I 64.58 21.74 121.87 26.03 67.44 20.45 126.01 27.44 66.41 21.74 124.21 27.23 68.28 18.48 129.98 29.45
France Telecom II 64.98 21.96 121.65 25.90 67.87 20.82 125.68 27.38 66.82 21.96 124.98 27.15 68.63 18.82 129.60 29.33
France Telecom III 59.48 17.98 122.00 26.99 59.21 14.99 123.47 27.92 58.61 17.98 124.98 27.74 60.56 14.42 131.52 29.89
Iberdrola I 92.62 13.12 295.50 57.70 94.08 15.55 222.38 58.51 95.11 13.12 279.93 64.98 99.38 14.87 288.35 68.69
Kingfisher 191.71 46.30 435.00 101.87 193.77 48.05 417.92 104.68 196.90 46.30 504.99 110.12 198.97 42.65 451.60 112.29
Koninklijke KPN 72.20 25.16 159.51 28.04 73.19 27.06 150.60 28.68 72.43 25.16 150.34 29.54 74.99 24.66 153.50 32.63
Louis Vuitton I 71.15 15.74 246.00 50.72 66.59 15.97 192.27 44.48 68.54 15.74 241.28 51.84 68.94 13.52 215.16 50.47
Louis Vuitton II 65.95 11.55 246.00 54.05 56.99 11.08 172.17 43.20 63.18 11.55 256.77 56.03 62.13 10.45 215.36 53.00
Philips 59.31 13.80 162.66 34.89 60.41 15.05 178.02 36.68 60.01 13.80 177.75 38.07 62.20 16.88 544.72 50.23
PPR 252.50 49.20 759.03 199.38 235.09 42.71 626.48 178.01 260.37 0.31 777.31 214.88 253.72 20.45 766.72 209.60
Repsol YPF 115.13 21.18 441.16 111.58 111.62 21.93 418.33 103.32 129.17 21.18 538.76 135.36 129.48 17.89 540.68 136.95
Saint Gobain II 177.26 25.63 555.63 134.35 177.34 26.74 598.69 135.17 178.87 25.63 542.81 139.96 184.10 24.75 716.99 150.31
Saint Gobain III 156.89 19.87 522.04 132.37 157.73 19.99 558.35 136.76 162.85 19.87 551.90 145.83 166.59 16.22 678.78 149.80
Schneider 68.66 17.59 199.78 42.03 59.11 16.01 190.79 36.62 59.73 17.59 224.02 48.43 66.01 18.25 205.27 45.13
SES 77.35 24.58 181.86 41.73 67.10 25.24 209.14 49.28 75.85 24.58 171.71 38.95 73.58 22.70 186.25 46.81
Siemens 76.03 13.98 238.85 56.55 76.03 15.31 221.31 52.55 75.30 13.98 237.34 53.11 76.17 14.24 243.46 54.22
Technip 98.66 16.83 302.73 80.09 104.16 18.73 337.98 85.92 104.66 16.83 331.48 82.84 118.05 9.19 359.02 89.82
Telecom Italia I 183.38 30.18 546.17 138.43 181.85 31.08 509.91 134.23 185.45 30.18 506.29 140.39 183.89 30.76 533.91 140.90
Telecom Italia II 184.89 30.95 540.33 136.07 183.87 32.87 502.01 131.94 187.16 30.95 503.61 137.81 186.49 33.07 532.19 138.95
Telefonica 97.99 25.54 247.69 54.96 93.37 28.53 203.95 46.64 94.97 25.54 228.13 49.22 98.27 25.26 258.90 53.15
Telekom Austria 59.18 13.71 142.58 30.07 67.44 14.34 194.68 41.74 63.00 13.71 160.78 34.63 69.16 14.41 206.46 44.21
Teliasonera 62.75 18.82 127.51 25.89 67.02 19.01 130.62 27.39 65.70 18.82 126.65 26.67 68.52 18.76 186.44 30.58
Tesco I 59.59 8.94 182.00 52.12 52.16 8.43 152.47 42.97 59.16 8.94 198.54 51.65 57.72 6.61 175.34 46.65
Tesco II 64.20 11.19 182.19 49.32 60.26 11.31 162.82 43.96 66.21 11.19 198.35 51.82 62.94 11.47 175.18 44.84
Thales 78.50 12.70 300.99 60.90 75.73 13.66 314.25 63.64 77.27 12.70 313.26 61.36 77.59 14.90 299.55 61.62
Thyssenkrupp 192.95 25.52 580.00 166.28 198.62 25.45 599.56 174.80 204.98 17.06 652.42 182.89 206.40 23.67 589.30 180.49
Union Fenosa 88.40 13.73 382.50 82.13 90.06 17.20 396.35 84.08 92.34 13.73 388.82 84.11 92.00 14.71 349.09 79.00
Volkswagen 132.69 18.92 360.02 91.15 143.18 18.38 418.14 104.23 142.96 5.87 415.92 104.38 140.31 15.61 429.68 103.28
Volvo 219.66 16.24 733.80 234.40 230.55 16.02 790.37 237.53 226.83 16.24 774.29 228.44 217.25 10.26 724.63 227.37
Average 103.14 20.64 306.15 73.29 102.11 20.84 291.86 72.04 105.70 18.38 318.75 77.71 107.20 18.21 334.28 79.59
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for the period before the crisis. The last three column contain the order of integration of the
CDS premium, ASP spread and the basis for the crisis period.
Issuer CDS ASP Basis CDS ASP Basis
Akzo Nobel I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Akzo Nobel II I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Altadis I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Astrazeneca - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Auchan - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
BASF - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bayer - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Belgacom - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
BMW I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bouygues I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bouygues II I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
British AM Tob. I I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
British AM Tob. II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carrefour I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Carrefour II I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Casino I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Casino II I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Casino III - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Compass Group I(0) I(0) I(0) - - -
Edison I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Enel I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energias de Portugal I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energias de Portugal II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
E.ON I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
France Telecom I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
France Telecom II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
France Telecom III I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Iberdrola I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Iberdrola II I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Kingfisher I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Koninklijke KPN I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Louis Vuitton I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Louis Vuitton II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Philips - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
PPR I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Reed Elsevier I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Renault I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Repsol YPF I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Reuters I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Saint Gobain I I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Saint Gobain II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Saint Gobain III I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Saint Gobain IV I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Scania I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Schneider - - - I(0) I(0) I(0)
SES I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Siemens I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Sodexho I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Stora Enso I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Technip I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telecom Italia I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telecom Italia II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telefonica I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telekom Austria I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Teliasonera - - - I(1) I(1) I(1)
Tesco I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Tesco II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Thales I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Thyssenkrupp I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Union Fenosa I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Veolia Environ I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vinci I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vivendi I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vodafone I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Volkswagen I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Volvo I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
November 2005 - August 2007 August 2007 - June 2009
Table II: Unit Root Test for Credit Spreads
Table II reports the results of the unit root test for the credit spreads and the basis. The first
three columns contain the order of integration of the CDS premium, ASP spread and the basis
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period before crisis while Panel B reports the descriptive statistics corresponding to the crisis. * indicates long-run arbitrage
opportunities according to Table II.
Panel A
Issuer Sample Size Min (€) Max (€) Median (€) Mean (€) S.D. (€) Skewness Kurtosis
Akzo Nobel I* 252 -263.31 127.31 -15.14 -28.12 89.85 -0.36 2.48
Akzo Nobel II 405 -117.31 314.56 124.47 124.77 87.34 -0.09 2.36
Altadis* 402 -36.73 541.64 220.79 225.94 126.69 0.13 2.47
BMW 343 -118.89 6.38 0.00 -18.63 33.93 -1.43 3.49
Bouygues I* 377 -85.84 378.81 108.99 111.47 100.66 0.20 2.33
Bouygues II* 414 -119.82 5.94 -0.18 -27.97 41.79 -0.98 2.20
British AM Tob. I 418 -224.29 136.07 -1.95 -25.35 75.36 -0.74 4.01
British AM Tob. II 299 49.11 637.32 236.93 258.20 125.55 0.74 2.92
Carrefour I 299 -210.59 342.67 123.07 127.35 70.13 -0.10 5.27
Carrefour II 443 -158.68 10.16 0.02 -20.31 42.58 -1.79 4.67
Casino I* 273 -236.88 531.98 148.18 147.37 124.15 0.22 2.54
Casino II 397 -167.80 554.81 121.12 131.37 127.81 0.70 2.98
Compass Group 405 -36.25 554.61 113.24 129.38 136.74 0.95 3.28
Edison* 404 -33.58 671.12 297.26 273.62 161.16 -0.03 1.91
Enel 316 -233.54 122.46 -0.01 -3.99 48.76 -0.93 6.00
Energias de Portugal I 363 -110.53 3.70 -0.04 -25.28 36.30 -0.84 2.00
Energias de Portugal II 349 -127.60 68.35 -0.01 -16.09 44.16 -1.11 3.45
E.ON 410 -116.90 42.08 -0.90 -20.13 35.30 -0.98 3.02
France Telecom I* 146 -33.50 212.43 46.13 52.98 53.61 0.74 3.16
France Telecom II 122 -77.94 158.41 51.03 55.29 42.01 0.33 3.34
France Telecom III 440 -332.43 8.65 0.05 -14.86 67.25 -4.23 18.98
Iberdrola I 400 -84.76 8.87 -0.05 -19.38 30.28 -0.96 2.05
Iberdrola II 348 -107.16 4.15 -1.28 -30.11 33.61 -0.52 1.78
Kingfisher 400 -147.86 222.92 44.36 42.28 60.03 -0.21 3.94
Koninklijke KPN 273 -0.41 398.51 181.80 178.27 84.24 0.11 2.38
Louis Vuitton I 287 -64.87 345.12 138.34 146.09 70.97 0.12 3.12
Louis Vuitton II 414 -35.14 352.81 119.32 121.76 84.66 0.32 2.43
PPR 353 -120.38 679.26 291.10 285.61 170.16 -0.04 2.09
Reed Elsevier 387 -158.42 12.96 -12.63 -35.87 44.16 -0.84 2.38
Renault* 344 -26.46 483.63 188.59 187.04 94.12 0.06 2.80
Repsol YPF 410 -64.16 573.18 151.33 174.82 140.43 0.47 2.27
Reuters* 415 -79.56 523.83 109.21 127.21 111.02 0.70 2.85
Saint Gobain I 398 -326.44 132.47 0.05 2.09 60.54 -0.83 5.38
Saint Gobain II 310 -25.82 402.05 192.10 186.13 81.36 0.15 2.45
Saint Gobain III 452 -132.28 479.56 177.52 160.39 124.46 -0.03 1.95
Saint Gobain IV 356 -27.17 176.08 53.42 55.83 49.54 0.50 2.35
Scania* 380 -209.71 7.99 0.04 -16.79 49.86 -2.73 8.86
SES* 367 -118.50 93.99 0.00 8.54 24.59 0.19 6.97
Siemens 274 -122.21 24.30 0.00 -10.11 23.42 -2.81 11.59
Sodexho* 403 -0.43 776.56 369.08 357.99 192.90 -0.01 1.96
Stora Enso* 449 -147.99 318.71 107.43 104.74 90.16 -0.03 1.97
Technip* 311 -6.32 512.24 137.88 143.40 131.97 0.76 2.89
Telecom Italia I 397 -168.95 67.73 -4.11 -14.96 41.02 -1.31 6.40
Telecom Italia II 338 -327.23 248.78 -8.94 -17.73 90.59 -0.54 3.84
Telefonica* 394 -161.50 351.80 119.98 116.38 96.16 0.11 2.46
Telekom Austria 407 -216.61 10.43 0.04 -23.45 55.39 -2.20 6.49
Tesco I* 411 -124.89 9.89 0.00 -22.96 40.64 -1.27 2.86
Tesco II* 358 -0.04 388.22 187.28 177.83 89.68 -0.26 2.07
Thales* 260 -64.51 308.67 72.56 75.33 68.35 0.92 3.83
Thyssenkrupp* 355 -177.82 371.69 117.90 114.70 103.87 0.12 2.35
Union Fenosa 409 -144.62 365.64 107.83 119.61 104.52 0.13 2.04
Veolia Environ 424 -123.08 6.13 -36.26 -36.83 38.85 -0.36 1.62
Vinci 431 -248.46 87.01 -0.02 -18.57 53.56 -1.77 7.32
Vivendi 414 -63.05 299.16 25.82 54.13 71.76 1.20 3.89
Vodafone* 384 -169.58 121.65 -9.99 -24.64 61.25 -0.39 2.45
Volkswagen 310 -232.47 295.36 108.34 109.53 74.00 -0.45 3.95
Volvo 412 -121.11 136.63 -19.39 -24.37 38.92 -0.44 3.46
Average 363 -125.32 263.64 78.63 73.53 78.11 -0.38 3.73
Table III: Descriptive Statistics for Incremental Cumulative Trading Profits
This table provides descriptive statistics for the increment in the discounted cumulative trading profits, which are obtained from
the cash-and-carry arbitrage strategy and are denoted as ?v(t). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics corresponding to the
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Panel B
Issuer Sample Size Min (€) Max (€) Median (€) Mean (€) S.D. (€) Skewness Kurtosis
Akzo Nobel I 480 -312.96 38.05 0.01 -21.73 66.99 -2.87 7.00
Astrazeneca 415 -506.96 187.62 19.78 -33.32 161.45 -0.96 0.10
Auchan 472 -635.74 1373.19 11.49 115.85 381.50 1.54 2.24
BASF 480 -223.42 20.64 -0.01 -17.54 51.05 -2.83 6.88
Bayer 480 -269.88 2987.31 459.25 627.79 582.89 1.16 1.11
Belgacom 480 -308.50 390.79 0.21 36.99 120.29 0.58 2.01
BMW 480 -331.21 25.63 -0.16 -24.83 67.34 -2.75 7.01
Bouygues I 480 -1367.03 1392.84 62.97 57.50 383.58 0.04 2.19
British AM Tob. II* 480 -121.11 5192.88 777.32 1211.50 1176.86 1.19 0.62
Carrefour I 480 -233.06 22.32 -0.36 -24.08 55.41 -2.19 3.62
Carrefour II 463 -203.87 28.80 -1.04 -33.02 62.00 -1.44 0.30
Casino G. P. I 480 -694.12 2827.54 99.17 296.95 603.76 1.76 3.57
Casino G. P. II 442 -1493.23 834.44 -0.25 -93.64 401.82 -0.81 0.94
Casino G. P. III 480 -295.07 4439.21 575.94 921.33 995.94 1.36 1.22
Edison 480 -753.78 3190.80 291.44 536.99 693.19 1.40 1.54
Enel* 480 -404.82 22.50 -0.05 -24.41 83.35 -3.33 9.83
Energias de Portugal I* 312 -327.60 243.70 -0.12 -34.30 93.76 -1.14 2.37
Energias de Portugal II 480 -282.72 27.18 -0.09 -25.69 72.00 -2.56 4.94
France Telecom I 480 -938.23 508.55 0.42 -89.40 316.69 -0.52 -0.64
France Telecom II 480 -622.14 2641.78 357.34 514.26 540.29 1.27 1.39
France Telecom III 480 -239.45 25.13 -0.82 -30.18 62.72 -1.95 2.49
Iberdrola I 480 -252.78 39.22 -0.32 -27.42 64.19 -2.19 3.51
Kingfisher 324 -1425.17 3383.41 77.86 329.24 797.85 0.89 1.49
Koninklijke KPN 480 -181.45 6018.88 905.42 1313.90 1224.85 1.37 1.33
Louis Vuitton I 480 -1616.56 1107.59 90.56 -36.30 546.18 -0.82 0.43
Louis Vuitton II 445 -1025.47 593.97 29.03 -56.82 362.17 -0.60 -0.32
Philips 480 -572.69 200.56 0.03 -11.42 130.34 -1.89 5.82
PPR 480 -1089.23 344.26 35.50 -10.88 264.10 -1.83 3.68
Repsol YPF 451 -3134.09 2119.35 151.50 97.05 861.39 -1.20 2.68
Saint Gobain II 480 -2070.10 2296.55 141.71 75.26 634.94 0.08 1.27
Saint Gobain III 435 -1617.87 783.78 36.35 -98.24 485.71 -0.88 0.07
Schneider 480 -617.60 1017.40 27.88 50.62 254.37 -0.28 0.36
SES* 480 -522.90 4192.00 264.83 479.69 702.76 2.25 5.92
Siemens 480 -243.25 22.16 -0.07 -23.48 64.81 -2.40 3.92
Technip 480 -1727.33 3282.13 324.61 346.18 649.37 -0.42 1.81
Telecom Italia I 480 -4577.43 1531.38 121.73 -265.17 1253.56 -1.61 1.88
Telecom Italia II 480 -811.16 4560.67 591.18 783.26 812.20 1.37 2.22
Telefonica 480 -1127.02 2126.51 195.86 227.94 391.27 0.84 3.03
Telekom Austria* 372 -589.60 3955.00 272.20 503.60 743.14 2.50 6.50
Teliasonera* 480 -60.45 5151.41 900.01 1257.90 1127.19 1.28 0.97
Tesco I 433 -1568.02 2058.54 25.06 153.66 542.60 1.60 3.20
Tesco II 480 -732.93 1390.59 43.92 119.07 377.67 1.17 1.67
Thales 480 -185.89 21.57 -0.42 -22.50 45.84 -1.85 2.15
Thyssenkrupp* 480 -429.46 57.17 -0.25 -26.40 67.95 -3.56 15.27
Union Fenosa 480 -247.97 60.78 -0.58 -28.10 61.62 -1.70 1.94
Volkswagen 480 -205.68 44.81 -0.62 -25.05 49.73 -1.91 3.04
Volvo 371 -648.70 556.50 76.04 58.94 256.32 -0.31 -0.17
Average 462 -805.23 1560.36 148.12 192.16 420.11 -0.49 2.86
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Panel A reports the statistical test results obtained for the period before crisis (November 2005 - August 2007) while Panel B
reports the results obtained during the crisis  (August 2007 - June 2009). The first four columns of each panel include the
estimated parameters. The next four columns report the t-statistic of the corresponding parameter. The nineth column of each
panel shows whether statistical arbitrage (SA) opportunities exist or not.† The tenth column of each panel presents the p-value
associated to the absence of SA. The last column reports the existence or absence of SA under JTTW test. In boldface are
the statistical arbitrage opportunities detected by our test.
Panel A
SA
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? p-value
Akzo Nobel I  -2x10-3 67.55 2.05 0.02 -0.59 5.05 6.53 0.50 No 0.59 No
Akzo Nobel II 14.18 11.46 0.42 0.38 5.05 4.64 11.01 8.98 No 0.35 Yes***
Altadis 12.48 13.82 0.56 0.38 6.24 5.06 18.45 9.83 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
BMW -59.66 37.89 -0.25 -0.03 -2.76 4.98 -3.00 -0.63 No 1.00 No
Bouygues I 1.52 32.67 0.83 0.18 2.59 5.57 11.84 4.97 Yes* 0.06 Yes***
Bouygues II -82.59 40.11 -0.22 0.01 -3.63 4.81 -3.66 0.14 No 1.00 No
British AM Tob. I 98.68 90.79 -1.62 -0.03 1.16 4.86 -1.89 -0.67 No 1.00 No
British AM Tob. II 54.86 40.32 0.32 0.19 4.90 5.38 7.75 4.97 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Carrefour I 39.84 6.03 0.25 0.48 13.48 6.01 14.26 13.91 No 0.92 No
Carrefour II -71.84 53.33 -0.26 -0.05 -2.66 5.40 -3.18 -1.32 No 1.00 No
Casino I 7.71 27.83 0.61 0.28 2.79 4.74 8.58 6.36 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Casino II 3.32 28.60 0.70 0.26 2.22 7.01 8.57 9.44 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Compass Group 3.37 52.32 0.70 0.17 1.88 7.16 7.25 6.15 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Edison 2.71 12.80 0.87 0.34 6.56 6.52 31.78 11.30 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Enel 0.00 14.79 4.42 0.23 0.00 3.62 53.93 8.23 No 0.86 No
Energias de Portugal I -74.31 36.63 -0.23 -0.01 -3.59 4.86 -3.61 -0.12 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal II -68.21 47.46 -0.31 -0.02 -2.49 5.34 -3.23 -0.45 No 1.00 No
E.ON -37.51 40.50 -0.13 -0.03 -2.33 5.62 -1.44 -0.82 No 1.00 No
France Telecom I 0.27 11.86 1.22 0.28 1.45 5.48 8.24 6.44 No 0.10 Yes***
France Telecom II 11.14 5.03 0.40 0.49 4.89 3.71 7.47 7.14 No 0.50 No
France Telecom III -330.98 73.33 -0.81 -0.03 -4.25 5.26 -4.86 -0.67 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola I -58.25 33.35 -0.23 -0.02 -3.63 5.15 -3.79 -0.59 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola II -57.61 27.08 -0.15 0.04 -4.51 4.43 -3.16 0.76 No 1.00 No
Kingfisher 1.57 27.82 0.63 0.14 1.35 5.38 4.70 3.88 Yes* 0.08 Yes***
Koninklijke KPN 31.58 15.03 0.36 0.31 8.11 5.79 14.13 8.59 No 0.23 Yes***
Louis Vuitton I 57.60 50.72 0.20 0.06 4.70 4.99 4.52 1.37 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Louis Vuitton II 1.18 26.05 0.87 0.15 3.17 6.33 15.57 4.98 Yes* 0.08 Yes***
PPR 3.94 20.21 0.83 0.29 5.51 5.50 24.84 8.07 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Reed Elsevier -48.31 54.90 -0.06 -0.05 -3.20 5.28 -0.97 -1.19 No 1.00 No
Renault 11.75 19.38 0.55 0.24 6.37 5.19 18.38 6.14 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Repsol YPF 0.71 13.99 1.03 0.36 3.15 7.49 18.27 14.02 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Reuters 0.52 8.99 1.03 0.41 2.56 7.21 14.79 15.39 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Saint Gobain I 4.36 8.76 -1.46 0.36 0.52 6.30 -0.92 11.75 No 1.00 No
Saint Gobain II 46.42 20.30 0.28 0.23 7.81 6.01 10.89 7.03 Yes* 0.09 Yes**
Saint Gobain III 0.49 15.38 1.07 0.30 3.41 5.51 20.87 8.72 No 0.13 Yes***
Saint Gobain IV 18.79 24.61 0.22 0.14 3.68 5.12 4.11 3.49 Yes* 0.08 Yes***
Scania -68.78 75.84 -0.29 -0.09 -1.86 5.46 -2.50 -2.44 No 1.00 No
SES 0.22 4.49 0.71 0.32 0.88 6.87 3.37 11.28 No 0.10 Yes***
Siemens -0.43 5.99 0.65 0.28 -0.82 4.81 2.69 6.34 No 0.95 No
Sodexho 6.52 41.16 0.76 0.15 6.64 6.53 28.16 5.16 Yes** 0.03 Yes***
Stora Enso 0.29 9.84 1.08 0.35 2.68 5.36 16.63 9.88 No 0.17 Yes***
Technip 16.92 39.30 0.43 0.23 2.78 5.09 6.13 5.75 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Telecom Italia I -4.47 14.91 0.24 0.20 -1.37 4.45 1.67 4.45 No 1.00 No
Telecom Italia II  -3x10-4 32.82 2.17 0.19 -0.41 5.46 4.97 5.15 No 0.58 No
Telefonica 0.36 10.71 1.09 0.35 2.91 5.54 17.72 9.76 No 0.17 Yes***
Telekom Austria -43.98 70.42 -0.13 -0.05 -1.63 5.86 -1.02 -1.47 No 1.00 No
Tesco I -78.92 40.38 -0.26  -1x10-3 -3.37 5.29 -3.81 -0.03 No 1.00 No
Tesco II 6.96 22.14 0.63 0.16 6.85 6.74 23.46 5.39 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Thales 48.80 26.02 0.09 0.20 4.06 4.67 1.67 4.39 No 0.63 No
Thyssenkrupp 18.67 17.40 0.36 0.35 4.18 4.45 7.61 7.69 No 0.53 No
Union Fenosa 0.55 19.32 1.01 0.26 2.74 6.79 15.69 9.12 No 0.24 Yes***
Veolia Environ. -39.40 44.15 -0.01 -0.03 -3.60 5.59 -0.25 -0.74 No 1.00 No
Vinci -0.42 8.50 0.71 0.35 -0.92 5.03 3.60 9.00 No 0.94 No
Vivendi 0.94 9.68 0.77 0.36 1.58 6.58 6.66 12.37 No 0.11 Yes***
Vodafone  -2x10-7 2.18 3.44 0.60 -0.49 3.92 9.70 11.81 No 0.47 No
Volkswagen 17.07 17.09 0.38 0.27 4.66 6.74 8.81 9.00 No 0.11 Yes***
Volvo -6.68 40.84 0.25 -0.01 -1.94 5.89 2.68 -0.38 No 1.00 No
Table IV: Statistical Arbitrage Test for Unconstrained Mean (UM) model
Parameters
Under the UM model, the process for the increment in the discounted cumulative trading profits is defined as ?vi??i
?+i?zi.
t-stat
SA SA (JTTW)Issuer
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Panel B
SA
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? p-value
Akzo Nobel I -238.73 67.18 -0.53 -0.01 -3.89 5.38 -6.08 -0.15 No 1.00 No
Astrazeneca -0.25 82.09 0.93 0.13 -0.44 5.26 2.32 3.48 No 0.67 No
Auchan -157.36 14.62 -1.17 0.58 -10.74 8.06 -3.69 25.18 No 1.00 No
BASF -76.46 65.90 -0.30 -0.05 -1.99 6.12 -2.71 -1.68 No 1.00 No
Bayer 4.12 17.32 0.92 0.58 2.55 5.18 13.09 15.83 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Belgacom 4.65 11.35 0.40 0.44 1.72 3.94 3.58 9.06 No 0.53 No
BMW -198.15 71.26 -0.44 -0.01 -3.35 5.47 -5.33 -0.43 No 1.00 No
Bouygues I 10.91 21.76 0.36 0.51 1.88 7.04 3.53 19.21 No 0.65 No
British AM Tob. II 0.69 11.45 1.35 0.74 2.59 8.38 20.07 33.28 Yes** 0.03 Yes***
Carrefour I -70.70 69.77 -0.21 -0.05 -2.09 5.97 -2.17 -1.46 No 1.00 No
Carrefour II -91.26 69.85 -0.20 -0.02 -2.48 5.60 -2.41 -0.73 No 1.00 No
Casino I 0.15 10.45 1.45 0.75 0.92 7.30 7.74 29.21 No 0.16 Yes**
Casino II 0.00 4.06 2.65 0.41 -0.34 5.93 5.42 12.82 No 0.67 No
Casino III 1.08 21.69 1.22 0.64 2.05 7.23 14.37 24.51 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Edison 1.36 32.40 1.09 0.52 1.83 8.14 11.38 22.79 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Enel -82.74 116.84 -0.24 -0.07 -1.42 6.40 -1.67 -2.28 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal I -66.19 98.89 -0.12 -0.01 -1.75 5.64 -1.08 -0.35 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal II -82.64 96.30 -0.23 -0.06 -1.72 6.28 -2.03 -1.93 No 1.00 No
France Telecom I 72.24 43.58 -0.38 0.37 2.36 5.35 -2.51 10.51 No 1.00 No
France Telecom II 23.22 15.56 0.57 0.61 4.01 5.63 11.74 18.07 No 0.55 No
France Telecom III -104.98 74.34 -0.25 -0.04 -2.50 5.73 -2.92 -1.06 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola I -89.98 78.76 -0.24 -0.04 -2.14 5.80 -2.42 -1.27 No 1.00 No
Kingfisher 0.00 15.45 2.30 0.74 0.25 5.86 3.14 21.39 No 0.46 No
Koninklijke KPN 2.03 18.07 1.17 0.66 2.35 7.53 15.71 26.52 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Louis Vuitton I -11.53 16.33 -0.94 0.63 -0.76 5.99 -1.05 19.99 No 1.00 No
Louis Vuitton II -176.41 23.14 -0.79 0.51 -8.16 5.18 -4.74 13.82 No 1.00 No
Philips -80.45 82.09 -0.43 0.09 -1.39 5.25 -2.15 2.42 No 1.00 No
PPR -135.61 79.49 -0.57 0.22 -2.20 6.17 -2.64 7.30 No 1.00 No
Repsol YPF 3.90 11.75 0.68 0.75 1.73 8.53 6.28 34.31 No 0.44 No
Saint Gobain II 29.38 16.66 0.32 0.65 3.73 6.11 5.31 21.15 No 0.93 No
Saint Gobain III 0.00 52.84 2.12 0.40 -0.31 5.68 3.95 12.07 No 1.00 No
Schneider 11.01 18.70 0.32 0.48 1.82 4.50 2.87 11.39 No 0.64 No
SES 0.26 2.86 1.36 0.94 2.18 6.67 13.82 33.24 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Siemens -166.11 71.49 -0.41 -0.02 -2.97 5.55 -4.70 -0.66 No 1.00 No
Technip 3.82 3.54 0.85 0.93 3.76 5.34 16.54 26.17 No 0.80 No
Telecom Italia I 72.40 9.96 0.07 0.85 8.74 8.02 1.07 36.51 No 1.00 No
Telecom Italia II 16.25 21.86 0.71 0.56 3.39 6.55 13.01 21.43 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Telefonica 24.20 13.19 0.42 0.60 4.56 7.18 9.36 22.94 No 0.76 No
Telekom Austria 0.21 2.23 1.47 1.04 2.11 7.49 17.59 41.54 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Teliasonera 7.01 9.26 0.92 0.70 6.60 24.42 69.97 7.44 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Tesco I -128.68 5.52 -0.24 0.81 -25.52 6.76 -6.23 29.18 No 1.00 No
Tesco II -108.21 15.23 -0.48 0.58 -8.25 6.99 -5.20 21.55 No 1.00 No
Thales -32.44 49.43 -0.07 -0.01 -2.06 5.81 -0.76 -0.46 No 1.00 No
Thyssenkrupp -69.91 86.34 -0.19 -0.05 -1.83 5.92 -1.73 -1.49 No 1.00 No
Union Fenosa 0.40 33.52 1.29 0.53 1.35 7.03 10.09 19.71 No 0.12 Yes***
Volkswagen -83.03 56.11 -0.24 -0.03 -2.80 5.85 -3.16 -0.79 No 1.00 No
Volvo 10.22 62.75 0.30 0.27 1.18 5.96 2.16 8.57 No 0.25 Yes**
t-stat
SA SA (JTTW)
Issuer Parameters
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to the crisis period (August 2007 - June 2009). The first column of each panel reports the total profits in Euros. The second
column of each panel shows the number of investment days while the third one shows the total investment in ASPs or
total number of investment days. The last column includes a modification of the symmetric downside-risk Sharpe ratio in
Ziemba (2005), which is obtained as the ratio between the total profits and the corresponding semivariance of the payments.
In boldface are the statistical arbitrage opportunities deteced by our test.
Number of Total investment Returns per Days with Modified
investment days in AS/CDSs AS/CDS invest. (b.p.) losses (%) Ziemba Ratio
Akzo Nobel I -7,089 152 76,000,000 -0.93 0.49 -117.71
Akzo Nobel II 50,534 344 172,000,000 2.94 0.06 871.42
Altadis 90,829 300 150,000,000 6.06 0.00 1274.58
BMW -6,391 15 7,500,000 -8.52 1.00 -114.33
Bouygues I 42,025 197 98,500,000 4.27 0.11 880.47
Bouygues II -11,578 21 10,500,000 -11.03 1.00 -234.42
British AM Tob. I -10,595 42 21,000,000 -5.05 0.76 -140.05
British AM Tob. II 77,202 232 116,000,000 6.66 0.00 2632.81
Carrefour I 38,077 221 110,500,000 3.45 0.04 809.54
Carrefour II -8,996 13 6,500,000 -13.84 1.00 -131.55
Casino I 40,231 148 74,000,000 5.44 0.05 1173.74
Casino II 52,153 196 98,000,000 5.32 0.08 1293.27
Compass Group 52,398 121 60,500,000 8.66 0.01 24460.91
Edison 110,543 339 169,500,000 6.52 0.00 1610.33
Enel -1,263 91 45,500,000 -0.28 0.58 -21.70
Energias de Portugal I -9,176 21 10,500,000 -8.74 1.00 -474.67
Energias de Portugal II -5,615 37 18,500,000 -3.04 0.62 -106.64
E.ON -8,255 43 21,500,000 -3.84 0.70 -251.67
France Telecom I 7,735 119 59,500,000 1.30 0.09 597.31
France Telecom II 6,745 100 50,000,000 1.35 0.01 268.70
France Telecom III -6,537 3 1,500,000 -43.58 1.00 -65.60
Iberdrola I -7,752 19 9,500,000 -8.16 1.00 -439.92
Iberdrola II -9,596 28 14,000,000 -6.85 1.00 -615.27
Kingfisher 16,911 270 135,000,000 1.25 0.19 396.31
Koninklijke KPN 48,667 221 110,500,000 4.40 0.00 1186.67
Louis Vuitton I 41,928 251 125,500,000 3.34 0.01 975.46
Louis Vuitton II 50,408 345 172,500,000 2.92 0.03 1127.47
PPR 100,819 289 144,500,000 6.98 0.02 1117.27
Reed Elsevier -13,883 36 18,000,000 -7.71 0.97 -414.19
Renault 64,342 249 124,500,000 5.17 0.01 1058.43
Repsol YPF 71,678 298 149,000,000 4.81 0.04 1665.42
Reuters 52,793 229 114,500,000 4.61 0.02 1684.79
Saint Gobain I 833 312 156,000,000 0.05 0.51 15.86
Saint Gobain II 57,699 261 130,500,000 4.42 0.00 1818.04
Saint Gobain III 72,495 348 174,000,000 4.17 0.09 1402.95
Saint Gobain IV 19,875 75 37,500,000 5.30 0.03 2101.89
Scania -6,382 7 3,500,000 -18.23 1.00 -84.03
SES 3,134 52 26,000,000 1.21 0.35 179.61
Siemens -2,771 36 18,000,000 -1.54 0.83 -83.01
Sodexho 144,270 350 175,000,000 8.24 0.00 1386.46
Stora Enso 47,029 250 125,000,000 3.76 0.13 1136.87
Technip 44,597 112 56,000,000 7.96 0.00 1339.04
Telecom Italia I -5,940 63 31,500,000 -1.89 0.70 -138.85
Telecom Italia II -5,993 197 98,500,000 -0.61 0.56 -77.62
Telefonica 45,854 317 158,500,000 2.89 0.09 1015.34
Telekom Austria -9,545 11 5,500,000 -17.35 1.00 -109.26
Tesco I -9,439 150 75,000,000 -1.26 1.00 -139.61
Tesco II 63,664 250 125,000,000 5.09 0.00 1070.41
Thales 19,586 110 55,000,000 3.56 0.05 738.67
Thyssenkrupp 40,719 235 117,500,000 3.47 0.10 820.77
Union Fenosa 48,922 250 125,000,000 3.91 0.13 1036.56
Veolia Environ. -15,617 34 17,000,000 -9.19 1.00 -727.89
Vinci -8,006 53 26,500,000 -3.02 0.66 -110.11
Vivendi 22,408 97 48,500,000 4.62 0.08 2131.29
Vodafone -9,462 233 116,500,000 -0.81 0.52 -198.53
Volkswagen 33,954 256 128,000,000 2.65 0.05 681.39
Volvo -10,040 71 35,500,000 -2.83 0.69 -320.31
Table V: Profits and Performance Measures
Table V reports the profits and performance measures corresponding to the different cases under study. This table splits
into two panels. Panel A refers to the period before the crisis (November 2005 - August 2007) while Panel B corresponds
CDSs, which is calculated as the number of investment days multiplied by the nominal of each purchase (500,000 euros).
The fourth column includes the returns in basis points obtained as the ratio between the first and the third columns. The
fifth column reports the probability of a loss, which is defined as the ratio between the number of days with losses and the
Panel A
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Number of Total investment Returns per Days with Modified
investment days in AS/CDSs AS/CDS invest. (b.p.) losses (%) Ziemba Ratio
Akzo Nobel I -10,431 6 3,000,000 -34.77 1.000 -101.75
Astrazeneca -13,828 81 40,500,000 -3.41 0.407 -99.34
Auchan 54,683 169 84,500,000 6.47 0.373 305.36
BASF -8,417 7 3,500,000 -24.05 1.000 -107.18
Bayer 301,341 347 173,500,000 17.37 0.032 2000.15
Belgacom 17,754 38 19,000,000 9.34 0.289 212.54
BMW -11,920 8 4,000,000 -29.80 1.000 -114.36
Bouygues I 27,598 260 130,000,000 2.12 0.377 86.12
British AM Tob. II 581,521 300 150,000,000 38.77 0.017 2386.71
Carrefour I -11,560 11 5,500,000 -21.02 1.000 -130.99
Carrefour II -15,850 13 6,500,000 -24.38 1.000 -156.35
Casino G. P. I 177,187 200 100,000,000 17.72 0.230 1065.67
Casino G. P. II -18,947 190 95,000,000 -1.99 0.453 -122.91
Casino G. P. III 442,238 231 115,500,000 38.29 0.056 2584.89
Edison 257,755 338 169,000,000 15.25 0.080 1780.05
Enel -11,719 5 2,500,000 -46.87 1.000 -92.62
Energias de Portugal I -16,025 20 10,000,000 -16.02 0.750 -126.52
Energias de Portugal II -12,331 7 3,500,000 -35.23 1.000 -111.00
France Telecom I -17,910 154 77,000,000 -2.33 0.442 -211.82
France Telecom II 246,844 298 149,000,000 16.57 0.108 1626.87
France Telecom III -14,488 13 6,500,000 -22.29 1.000 -143.50
Iberdrola I -13,160 10 5,000,000 -26.32 1.000 -129.91
Kingfisher 106,675 146 73,000,000 14.61 0.267 233.51
Koninklijke KPN 630,671 398 199,000,000 31.69 0.005 3246.02
Louis Vuitton I -17,424 282 141,000,000 -1.24 0.379 -33.23
Louis Vuitton II -17,272 243 121,500,000 -1.42 0.449 -103.31
Philips -5,484 44 22,000,000 -2.49 0.455 -33.04
PPR -5,221 116 58,000,000 -0.90 0.379 -15.63
Repsol YPF 46,583 358 179,000,000 2.60 0.310 49.07
Saint Gobain II 36,126 384 192,000,000 1.88 0.393 71.12
Saint Gobain III -17,957 202 101,000,000 -1.78 0.361 -107.86
Schneider 24,296 110 55,000,000 4.42 0.364 101.75
SES 230,252 119 59,500,000 38.70 0.091 2721.04
Siemens -11,270 7 3,500,000 -32.20 1.000 -112.62
Technip 166,168 194 97,000,000 17.13 0.144 328.26
Telecom Italia I -19,283 205 102,500,000 -1.88 0.341 -75.31
Telecom Italia II 375,964 299 149,500,000 25.15 0.057 1549.79
Telefonica 109,413 272 136,000,000 8.05 0.235 438.23
Telekom Austria 366,608 250 125,000,000 29.33 0.056 3242.14
Teliasonera 479,520 250 125,000,000 38.36 0.007 2186.69
Tesco I 73,755 276 138,000,000 5.34 0.453 308.19
Tesco II 57,154 250 125,000,000 4.57 0.408 294.27
Thales -10,800 15 7,500,000 -14.40 0.933 -145.61
Thyssenkrupp -12,673 12 6,000,000 -21.12 1.000 -118.63
Union Fenosa 240,685 250 125,000,000 19.25 0.236 965.01
Volkswagen -12,026 15 7,500,000 -16.03 1.000 -149.18
Volvo 23,846 150 75,000,000 3.18 0.373 116.86
Issuer Total Profits
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This table presents the effects of the potential determinants of statistical arbitrage opportunities. The results are
estimated by a Probit model with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The sample is formed by 104
cases/bonds from two different periods, 57 cases correspond to the period before crisis and 47 of them to the
crisis period. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a statistical arbitrage oppor-
tunity and 0 otherwise. The potential determinants of statistical arbitrage considered are: Rating  is a discrete
variable with values between 1 and 7, such that 1 corresponds to rating BBB- and 7 to rating AA-, the rest of
the values correspond to the intermediate ratings; Bond coupon ; Existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities
that refers to a dummy variable equals to one if there exists a long run arbitrage opportunity; Crisis  which is a
dummy variable with value equals to one when the observation corresponds to the crisis period. The first column
reports the estimated coefficients. The second column presents the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The third column reports the coefficient p-value  and last column reports the marginal effect.
Rating -0.377 0.124 0.002 -0.093
Bond coupon 0.313 0.176 0.075 0.078
Existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities 1.114 0.353 0.002 0.339
Crisis 0.003 0.334 0.992 0.001
Constant -1.467 1.029 0.154
R-squared 0.214
Number of observations 104
Wald chi2(4 df) 22.110
Prob > chi2 0.000
Marginal
Effect
Robust Std.
Err.Coefficient
Table VI: Determinants of Statistical Arbitrage Opportunities
P-value
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